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Abstract
The imperial Roman advance to and entrenchment along the Danube from the times of
Augustus to Aurelian, mirrored by the slow development of various Germanic peoples beyond
the 1,700-mile river’s northern bank, set the stage for a series of climactic engagements between
the late Roman Empire and their various barbarous neighbors along what had quickly become
the Empire’s most important and unstable frontier. The immigration and settlement of Goths
from the Pontic Steppe, fleeing the Huns as they emerged from Central Asia, within the Roman
Balkans undermined the Danube frontier, eviscerated the Eastern Roman field army, and enabled
Alaric’s role as a destabilizing free radical between the estranged imperial Roman courts at
Rome and Constantinople from 395 to 410. At the same time, the Huns, colliding with the
Roman frontiers on the Middle and Lower Danube, began to amass on the Pannonian and
Romanian Plains, and exerted a steadily increasing pressure on the Roman frontier. After having
buckled several times, particularly in Roman Pannonia on the increasingly isolated Middle
Danube, from the 410s to the 430s, Attila led two major invasions of the Eastern Roman Empire
in 441-442 and 447. Recognizing the importance of the Danube frontier to safeguarding
imperial security, Attila forced the Eastern Romans to completely abandon the Middle and
Lower Danube, evacuating all military posts and major populations at least a five-days march
south of the river, thereby destroying the Roman Danube frontier as the weakening Empire
advanced into late fifth century.

iv

List of Key Terms
Barbaricum – The lands populated by various Germanic and otherwise non-Roman tribes not
occupied by Roman forces beyond the Rhine or Danube frontiers.
Canaba (P.: Canabae) – Frontier civilian settlement which emerged in the vicinity of a Castrum
(Legionary Fortress).
Castellum (P.: Castella) – Fortlets, towers, and roadside Stations, considerably smaller than
castra, and formed the chain links along the Limes between the castra.
Castrum (P.: Castra) – Frontier Legionary Fortress, housing the main body of a legion assigned
to defend a specific segment of the limes of an imperial frontier.
Comitatenses – Mobile forces of infantry, cavalry, and other support units comprising the field
armies in the late Roman Empire.
Foederatus (P.: Foederati) – A people, settled or migratory, contracted under a foedus (treaty) to
serve the Roman state; by the time of the Roman Empire, the term was used to refer to barbarian
mercenaries in the service of the Roman legions, typically in exchange for the right for their
native tribe(s) to settle within imperial territories.
Foedus (P.: Foedera) – A Treaty, typically a treaty of alliance or federation with the Roman
state, and typically used in reference to a Foederatus (Contracted People or non-Roman
Mercenary Group).
Limes (P.: Limites) – A modern term used to refer to Roman frontier fortifications, particularly
along the German frontier along the Rhine; while a common Latin term used to refer to property
boundaries and geographic markers, the term was not used by the Romans for this purpose.
Limitanei – Roman forces specifically assigned to man the limes and otherwise maintain the
imperial frontiers. These forces were sometimes withdrawn from their posts for other uses,
including occasional employment alongside the regular comitatenses in major campaigns.
Magister Militum (P. Magistri Militum) – The ‘Master of Soldiers;’ this was a senior military
command of the late Roman Empire used in both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires from
the fourth century well into the Byzantine period. There were originally two distinct magistri:
one for the infantry, the magister peditum or ‘master of the foot,’ and one for the cavalry, the
magister equitum or ‘master of the horse.’
Magister Utriusque Militiae (Alternatively, Magister Equitum et Peditum) – This role, the
‘master of both forces’ or ‘commander-in-chief,’ occasionally used from the later fourth century
onwards, imputed the authority of both the magister peditum and the magister equitum to a
single individual.
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Introduction
...This was strife enough
having to own up to the past
by the Danube, whose gentle waves
embrace the past, present, and tomorrow.
The battles our ancestors had to fight
resolve into peace in remembrance's light.
It is time to work together at last
on our affairs in common—no small task.—József Attila

T

hey were many: Sarmatians, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Vandals, and Huns. Such were only
the largest of the ‘barbarian’ ethnicities to buffet and breach the Roman Empire’s frontier

on the Danube River over the course of the late fourth and fifth centuries. These were far from
the first incursions of foreign peoples into the distant frontier provinces of the Roman Empire, as
the legionnaires who had manned the Limes Germanicus for centuries could well attest.
Devastation wrought by such influxes were recurring and exacting, as they damaged local
infrastructure, plundered vulnerable farmland and dwellings, and occasionally involved the
losses of entire Roman villae rusticae, fortifications, and other emplacements. Due largely to the
Hunnic migrations between the 370s and 450s, the Danube frontier was subject to an
unprecedented weight of both Germanic and Hunnic invasions that would virtually destroy
Roman civilization in the riparian region, accelerating the breakdown of imperial governance in
the face of barbarian imminency and contributing to the famed “fall of Rome” in 476.
In the centuries since the collapse of the Roman West, Western historians, while
continually building upon the knowledge of the history of the later Roman Empire and its
Eastern Roman successor, have tended to perseverate over how to address many of the empire’s
frontiers. Academic attention paid to the Danube specifically has until recently been
fragmentary, with different aspects of the boundary analyzed across various topical studies.
There have been as of yet no comprehensive historical studies of the Roman Danube frontier
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from Rome’s earliest activities in the region with the Illyrian Wars in the 230s BC to the
cessation of Byzantine presence on its banks following the death of Emperor Manuel I
Komnenos in 1180. As such, the historiography behind the Roman Danube, particularly during
the late fourth and fifth centuries, remains highly irregular, running as a fine thread through the
fields of Roman and Byzantine history, Hunnic history, early Germanic history, early Slavic
history, and late antiquity studies. Perhaps this is unsurprising seeing that the late antiquity
studies themselves are not altogether that old and include the histories of the origins of presentday nationalities inhabiting the Danube region and studies written on the processes of
interregional diplomacy, geostrategy, polity collapse, and other subjects as they pertain to one of
history’s most remarkable civilizations.
Between the writings of Roman and Byzantine historians themselves—regrettably not all
the writings of which have survived to the present day—and Enlightenment scholars, the Roman
Danube was typically remembered and written on in passing, predominantly for its role as the
incidental setting for numerous developments which factored into the eventual collapse of the
Roman Empire in the late fifth century—a subject which would have featured more prominently
in the minds of educated Europeans prior to early modernity. Edward Gibbon’s six-volume
work, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-1789), the wellspring of
modern Western historical studies on Roman civilization and its titanic demise, remains
foundational among them. Taking a great deal of inspiration from earlier works like
Montesquieu’s Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and their Decline
(1734) and Jacques Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History to Monseigneur le Dauphin
(1681), Gibbon assigns the collapse of civil virtue under societal decadence, a protracted
development he controversially correlated to the adoption of Christianity as a state religion and
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“the total extirpation” of the old Roman Paganism, which he saw as to blame for instigating the
collapse of Rome.1 In tandem with this thesis, Gibbon emphasized the barbarian migrations
from Eastern Europe and the steppes beyond to central Europe, and the subsequent invasions of
the Empire between the third and fifth centuries on the Rhine and Danube, as being the critical
external force to coincidentally exploit Christianity’s allegedly degenerative internal influence on
Roman civilization.2 Despite being met with considerable hostility from many historians and
laymen alike for his portrayal of Christianity, Gibbon’s writings would nevertheless provide the
literary foundation for foregoing studies on Roman history, and his theses, however
controversial, would remain uncontested by alternative interpretations for the nearly a century.3
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall in many ways reflected both the historical interests and
popular concerns of his time. Composing his masterpiece throughout the 1770s and 1780s, he
bore witness to a number of critical setbacks to the imperial ambitions of his native British
Empire, including wars with most neighboring European great powers from Spain to the
Netherlands, ongoing colonial conflicts on her distant frontiers around the globe, and the loss of
the Thirteen Colonies in 1783. He was not alone in drawing cautionary parallels with the Roman
Empire as a model for European empires of his own time, as his work would be echoed and
referenced to no end by scholars and government fonctionnaires on both sides of the Channel.
By the 1850s, Theodore Mommsen, a rising classical scholar and jurist of Germany,
began to see a similar relatability of the Romans with his time. The transitional phase of Roman

1. Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Everyman’s
Library, 1993.), 3:136, 160-169; 4:120-121.
2. Ibid, 4:122-127.
3. In fact, Gibbon faced criticism for his accusatory thesis beset against Christianity almost immediately
after the publication of his second volume, as chapters 15 and 16, contained in the first and second volumes
respectively, were the first to cast the faith in unfavorable light. In particular response to an attack on his
first volumes by Balliol College academic Henry Davis, among others, Gibbon composed A Vindication
(1779) to publicly defend his composition from its first detractors. While Gibbon would claim a celebrated
victory, historical posterity would gradually dismiss his thesis on the supposed fault of the Christian faith.
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history from the late republic to the empire, wherein nascent imperialistic sentiments as
portrayed by Caesar and his fellows in the first century BC, bore a familiarity to Germany in the
mid-eighteenth century in the wake of the abortive revolutions of 1848. While politically
opposed to Bismarck and his methods later in life, as a German, Mommsen nevertheless desired
a unified German state rather than the rabble of various minor polities much of Germany
consisted of by his time. This greatly impacted his History of Rome (1854-1856), which
reflected the gradual collapse and reorganization of a failing republic, yielding particular
deference to Caesar, while an incipient empire-state led by a strong central authority emerged
from the chaos. The third of this three-volume history reflects on the process of the Roman
Republic’s expansion to what would later be the Empire’s frontiers on the Danube and elsewhere
across its fifth, eighth, and ninth chapters, though analysis of the Danube frontier under the
empire would remain noticeably absent; while ultimately lauded as a classic of Roman historical
literature, Mommsen’s work would remain unfinished as his career drew him to other projects.
Fortunately, two later publications would broaden the scope of his original work.
In 1885, Mommsen published his The Provinces of the Roman Empire from Caesar to
Diocletian as a continuation of his previous series, entreating each provincial region of the
Empire as a distinct subject deserving of its own chapter while omitting the overarching Roman
narrative that characterized his History. Furthermore, in 1992, recently rediscovered lecture
notes taken by attendees of his lectures on early imperial politics were edited and compiled into a
fourth volume, continuing the narrative of his History into the first centuries AD. All three
works, especially The Provinces, contributed welcome attention to the Danube frontier and its
tumultuous history to the time of Diocletian, providing a strong foundation for more pointed
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studies to be undertaken on the subject, particularly of its later years as the frontier holding back
the Goths and Huns, in the next century.
While Mommsen was beginning to labor on his The Provinces in the early 1880s, new
studies began to emerge focusing on the barbarous peoples on Rome’s frontiers as subjects of
study in their own right, not merely as opponents to or subjects of Rome’s ambition to spread its
vision of civilization as typically seen in the works of Gibbon and Mommsen. Thomas Hodgkin,
a nineteenth and early twentieth century banker and minister of the Society of Friends,
committed a considerable measure of his time to private historical study. Over nearly two
decades, he published his eight-volume Italy and Her Invaders (1880-1899), later republished as
The Barbarian Invasions of the Roman Empire, depicting the onset of the slow transition of the
Roman world into medievalry. Following a brief introduction of eighty-seven pages in his first
volume, wherein he summarizes imperial history from the times of Caesar and Octavian to the
370s, Hodgkin dedicates his work to the detailed analysis of the barbarian invasions of the fourth
and fifth centuries through to the death of Charlemagne in 814:
The story opened by the death-bed of Julian in a tent on the Assyrian plain; it closes by
the tomb of Austrasian Charles, with the notes of the Planctus de Obitu Karoli ringing in
our ears. In that space of half a millennium, kingdoms have risen and fallen; the one
great universal Empire has crumbled into hopeless ruin; the Teuton, the Sclave and the
Hun have seated themselves in the cities of the old Latin civilisation … It is true that the
waters of Chaos will still for centuries continue to roll over Europe, but the old classical
world has finally passed away, and we see fully installed before us those two great
figures, the German Emperor and the sovereign Roman Pope, whose noisy quarrels and
precarious reconciliations will be the central events of European history during the
Middle Ages.4
Hodgkin may have without saying as much have given a wordless label to ‘late antiquity’ nearly
a century before the field would be famously codified by Peter Brown. His first three volumes,
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Thomas Hodgkin, Italy and Her Invaders (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880-1899.), 8:303.
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presenting a homogenous narrative from the 370s to the 530s, offer a litany of references to the
affairs of the Danube frontier of the late Empire.
From the late eighteenth century through to the early twentieth, most historical
publications pertinent to the remembrance of the late Roman Danube contributed to the greater
beneficence of the historical scholar than his lay fellow, though this was steadily changing.
Founded by British publisher Thomas Fisher Unwin in 1885, while across the Channel
Mommsen published his The Provinces, the famous The Story of the Nations Library (18851908) book series sought “to present in a graphic manner the stories of the different nations that
have attained prominence in history,” with each national history contained comfortably within a
single cover for popular readership.5 Published twelfth among this innovative series, Henry
Bradley’s The Story of the Goths (1888) presents a concise narrative depicting principally the
story of the Visigoths and Ostrogoths specifically, from their nebulous origins beyond the
Carpathians to their emplacements around the Mediterranean, although myriad Germanic
peoples take to the stage at their side through their history. Over the first sixteen chapters, the
Danube, along with the lands of Scythia and Carpathia to the north and the Roman Provinces on
its southern shore, lies at the geographical center of the Gothic narrative between their migration
southwards toward and later invasions of the Roman Empire. Bradley’s general history, the first
modern publication to entreat the Goths to analysis on their own, would remain relatively
unquestioned in its general findings for over sixty years; only in the wake of the world wars
would radically new interpretations of their history begin to arise.
A noteworthy secondary effect of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall was the radical
underemphasis applied to Eastern Roman or ‘Byzantine’ history by the global academic
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Henry Bradley, The Story of the Goths: From the Earliest Times to the End of the Gothic Dominion in
Spain (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1888.), 377.
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community; Gibbon’s unreceptive writings on Byzantium and her empire over his history’s latter
three volumes, while eventually crucial to the creation of Byzantine history as a distinct field of
study, was a fundamental cause of the lack of scholarly historical development in Byzantine
studies throughout the nineteenth century, even though the same period witnessed the production
so many classics in the history of the Roman Empire-proper.6 Given his thesis presenting the
whole of Roman history as a downward-spiraling corruption of the Roman state and its culture as
the byproduct of Christianity’s official adoption—a thesis the millennial history of the Byzantine
Empire fundamentally invalidates—along with his likewise downward-spiraling health while
composing his latter three volumes, his perspective is scarcely surprising. Edward Foord’s The
Byzantine Empire (1911) aided in providing a welcome break to the trend for public readership,
“attempting to supply the need of a short popular history of the later Roman Empire, [as] there is
at present … no [such] book on the subject in the English language.”7 This assessment is almost
correct, as Sir Charles Oman’s The Byzantine Empire (1892/1893), belonging like Bradley’s
work to The Story of the Nations Library series, presented the actual first comprehensive study
on the Eastern Romans and their grand history.
By the close of the nineteenth century, John Bagnell Bury and Henri Pirenne was the first
to dissent from Gibbon’s theses and offer theses of their own on the fall of Rome and its
frontiers. Both Bury and Pirenne were heavily involved in the formation of Byzantine history
and what would later be termed ‘late antiquity’ as fields of historical inquiry distinct from both
antiquity-proper and the medieval era. In his History of the Later Roman Empire (1923) and The
Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians (1928), Bury emphasized the predominantly Germanic

6. John Julius Norwich, A Short History of Byzantium (New York: Vintage Books, 1999.), xxxix.
7. Edward A. Foord, The Byzantine Empire: The Rearguard of European Civilization (London: Adam and
Charles Black, 1911.), i.
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migrations into Germania and Carpathia and their subsequent invasions of the Roman frontiers
on the Rhine and Danube as a fundamental cause of the Western Roman Empire’s fall.8 “This
long process,” he writes, “shaped Europe into its present form,” and provided a rich foundation
for Roman historical study in the twentieth century, in no small part thanks to his editing and
adaptation of Gibbon’s masterpiece between 1898 and 1925.9
Conversely, Pirenne offered a composite thesis, termed by later historians as the “Pirenne
Thesis,” over the course of several historical studies, most notably his Medieval Cities (1927), A
History of Europe (1936), Economic History of Medieval Europe (1936), and Mohammed and
Charlemagne (1937). As an economic historian, Pirenne argued that while the Roman Empire
collapsed in the late fifth century, Roman civilization continued on in the late empire’s major
cities around the coasts of the Mediterranean and in Europe supported by the same routes of
commerce and communication which had enabled the empire’s creation and survival, even
without the imperial superstructure.10 It was not so much the barbarian invasions, which Pirenne
saw as a preserving influence for Roman civilization following the invasions, or the adoption of
Christianity which ultimately ended Roman civilization in Europe and the Mediterranean, but it
was instead the Islamic conquest of the Levant and North Africa in the seventh century which
resolutely put an end to the pan-Mediterranean commercial and social systems that enabled
Roman civilization to flourish throughout.11 While Pirenne’s writings and decentralized thesis
would pull academic interest toward the Mediterranean core of the empire rather than its
frontiers—though he would shed some light on the nature of the frontier provinces as a

8. John Bagnell Bury, The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians (London: N.p., 1928.), 7.
9. Ibid.
10. Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade - Updated Edition, Trans. Frank
D. Halsey. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.), ix-xxiv, 1-15.; Henri Pirenne, Mohammed and
Charlemagne (Eastford: Martino Fine Books, 2017.), 284-285.
11. Ibid.
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collective—they would nevertheless serve as major influences for pioneer historians of late
antiquity like Peter Brown and Edward Thompson in the 1960s and 1970s. For the time being,
however, in the midst of the chaos of the early half of the twentieth century—in a vein not unlike
that of Sir Walter Raleigh three centuries prior, much of Pirenne’s A History of Europe would be
written while in captivity, albeit as a POW in Germany—Pirenne’s writings would remain
unacknowledged.
Beyond obscuring numerous historical studies composed by historians of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for posterity, the world wars and the ideological
conflicts of the 1930s and 1940s would have profound impacts on the historical discipline and
the memory of the Roman Danube moving forward. Dr. Edward Arthur Thompson, a specialist
in relations between the Romans and their myriad neighbors, published A History of Attila and
the Huns (1948) in the efforts of analyzing the specific history of the Huns and their greatest
leaders in their own right; the Huns “have a story which has been told before, but the available
accounts in English are not altogether satisfactory.”12 While explaining with reasonable clarity
the general history of what to the 1940s was known of Attila and his people, including
occasional insights into the affairs of the Danube frontier, Thompson’s history ought be read
carefully due to its author’s affinity for Marxist interpretation. His revisionist agenda to fit the
Hun’s history into the awkward frame of class conflict is most readily apparent in his discussion
of the Hun’s origins among the steppes of Asia, wherein primary sources remain virtually
nonextant, and the allegedly confrontational affairs of the different economic classes of the
Eastern and Western Roman Empires.13

12. Edward Arthur Thompson, The Huns (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.), 3-4.
13. Ibid., 48-51, 231-237.
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While some of Thompson’s arguments are dubious with insufficient sourcing, the
perspective presented is nonetheless intriguing, and it stands as one of the first to integrate a
range of ethnographic papers for the sake of speculating—over an entire chapter, no less—on
Hunnic history prior to their engagement with the Romans in the 370s.14 Additionally, A History
of Attila and the Huns ought be credited for its attraction of academic interest towards the
Danube, though its considerable shortcomings would draw sharp criticism from numerous
scholars around the world—Dr. Otto Maenchen-Helfen standing foremost among them.
Maenchen-Helfen, formerly a leading specialist of Hunnic history and archaeology,
expanded his search for information on Rome’s barbarous European neighbors well beyond the
traditional collection of literary primary sources on Hunnic and late Roman history composed by
Priscus, Jordanes, and their fellow Roman historians to Russian, Central Asian, and Chinese
literature and archaeology.15 Whereas Thompson utilized academic convention to full effect,
being among the first to integrate ethnology into his studies of late Roman and Hunnic history,
Maenchen-Helfen scoured archives and archaeological sites from Central and Eastern Europe to
China to support his understanding of steppe culture past and present, going so far as to live with
and study Tuvan steppe nomads over several months in 1929.16 Ultimately his untimely death in
1969 would prevent him from completing his life’s work himself, leaving his lifetime of research
to be posthumously arranged over four years by a legion of scholars into the landmark work in
Hunnic and late Roman History, The World of the Huns (1973).17 The book provides unique
insights into all aspects of Hunnic life—many, like religion, pottery, art, and language having

14. Ibid., 46-68.
15. Otto J. Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns: Studies in Their History and Culture. Edited by Max
Knight. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.), xv-xvii, xxiv-xxvii.
16. Ibid., xxiii.
17. Ibid., xv.
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scarcely been studied in such detail before or since—and history, which presents in part a finely
detailed narrative of their relations and exchanges with the Roman Empire along the length of
the Danube.18
While Maenchen-Helfen’s fellows at the University of California Berkeley were working
to compile his masterpiece, Dr. Peter Brown published his The World of Late Antiquity (1971),
expounding upon and distinguishing late antiquity as a historical field of study in its own right,
identified as spanning from AD 150 to 750, partitioning antiquity-proper and the medieval age.19
This delineation simultaneously retro-categorized the works of Bury, Pirenne, and Thompson,
among others, and made the period in question markedly more accessible to rising historians.
Together, the works of Brown and Maenchen-Helfen served to roundly cap off the growing
historiography of the late Roman and Hunnic worlds and the limited understanding of the Roman
Danube itself to the early 1970s. In their wake, a rapidly growing multitude of Western
historians began to contribute to the new field and diversify available perspectives on its integral
subjects—the barbarous cultures on the Roman frontiers and the frontiers themselves well among
them.
An early contributor to the understanding of the late Roman Empire’s strategic layout,
Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, a strategic analyst and international relations specialist rather than
career historian, composed The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (1976) in the efforts of
synthesizing the eclectic whole of the late republican and early imperial military experience into
a concise process of strategic thought.20 To this end, Luttwak fit the Romans’ military history

18. Ibid., xv-xvii, 18-165.
19. Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1971.),
7-9.
20. Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century CE to the Third
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.), 1-5.
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from the first century AD to the third into an evolutionary paradigm, depicting a gradual
transition from scarcely defended, expansionist frontiers often managed through loosely aligned
border states to elaborate frontier defense networks of forts, battlements, and roadways.21
Luttwak would later write a sibling book, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (2009),
describing a growing emphasis of the use of strategic diplomacy and the Byzantine way of war to
neutralize threats, often by pitting foreign forces against one another, as decisively destroying or
subjugating the peripheral threats to the empire was scarcely feasible in the centuries after the
Romans’ experience combatting the Huns.22 Through these two books, Luttwak offers profound
analyses of the Danube frontier’s material evolution and the exchanges between the Romans and
the Huns through the fifth century; though both have spawned considerable controversy within
the academic community since their publications, they remain among the foremost studies in
contemporary Roman and Byzantine military scholarship.23
While Maenchen-Helfen’s monograph had provided for the remainder of the twentieth
century a thorough foundation of the Huns’ place in late antiquity, many of the Germanic groups
beyond the Rhine and Danube frontiers had yet to be individually or comprehensively addressed.
Bury and Thompson, together with segments of Maenchen-Helfen’s studies, had provided a
useful preamble to early Germanic history, but it would be left to Thomas Burns, Herwig
Wolfram, and Peter Heather, among others, to provide comprehensive historical monographs for
the various barbarous peoples beyond the riverine frontiers. Burns’ The History of the
Ostrogoths (1984) was among the first works to analyze the Germanic namesake of its title in

21. Ibid.
22. Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2009.), ix-xi.
23. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 98-118; Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the
Byzantine Empire, 17-48.
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specific detail, and it offers a few small glimpses of the Danube’s role in the relations between
barbarian realms before and, perhaps more interestingly, following the withdrawal of Roman
authority in the mid-fifth century.24 Barbarians within the Gates of Rome (1994) and Rome and
the Barbarians (2003) shed light on the Roman perspective on and relations with their neighbors,
with the lattermost work’s fifth chapter discussing understudied segments of the Roman frontier
on the Middle Danube in welcomely novel detail.25 A remarkable companion to Burns’ topical
studies, Wolfram is a leading historian in the affairs in of the early Germanic peoples. His
History of the Goths (1979), initially published in German, has become a standard in early
Germanic history and has since been published in a variety of languages, eventually reaching
English in 1990.
Peter Heather, a leader in fields of Roman-barbarian relations, has published numerous
works detailing the history of the barbarian migrations and the fall of Rome, including Goths and
Romans (1991), The Fall of the Roman Empire (2005), Empires and Barbarians (2010), and
Rome Resurgent (2018), among numerous others. His Goths and Romans, an expanded rendition
of his doctoral dissertation remains a well-known print in the field, as its focus is on critically
analyzing the writings of Jordanes’ Getica and describing the history of the barbarian migrations
without relying on such a ubiquitous late Roman primary source.26 Heather’s more recent
publications have largely expounded upon different aspects of Roman-barbarian relations and the
collapse of the Western Empire, though some like his early Byzantine military history, Rome
Resurgent, represent novel forays into sibling fields and time periods of study.

24. Thomas S. Burns, The History of the Ostrogoths (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.), 6465, 148.
25. Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, 100 B.C.–A.D. 400 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 2003.), 148-151, 194-247.
26. Peter Heather, Goths and Romans: 332-489 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.), vi-ix.
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Meanwhile, as Heather was working on his Empires and Barbarians, Dr. Christopher
Kelly produced his The End of Empire (2009), a history on the role of the barbarians, Attila and
the Huns foremost among them, in laying low the Roman Empire. While his book presents the
reader with a conventional narrative, clearly written for the benefit of a public audience, the
attention paid to the finer details of the Huns is commendable. The weary witness of the Roman
defenders on the Danube to the seething storm of Hunnic and Germanic peoples beyond is
effectively and colorfully portrayed throughout The End of Empire, although the occasional
details on the Danube itself, detailing Roman-Hunnic exchanges between the AD 370s and the
late 440s, remain solely within the book’s initial chapters.27 Theodosius II (2013), another of
Kelly’s studies, presents a fine anthology of recent articles published on the person, reign, and
history of Rome’s longest-reigning imperator, governing the Eastern Empire from
Constantinople from AD 408 to 450. Theodosius II’s reign witnessed the final wearisome
decades of the Danube frontier, concluding with his death only a few years before its gradual
destruction under the Huns and the migrations following the death of Attila in 453, and an
analysis of his controversial rule would prove a welcome insight into the regime behind the
empire’s longest frontier.
More recently, Dr. Kyle Harper’s The Fate of Rome (2017) presents a highly original
perspective on the causes, however indirect, of the collapse of the Roman Empire. While his
eclectic bibliography acknowledges the forgoing theses on the subject, Harper postulates that
changes in the Earth’s environment during late antiquity, particularly the production of a cooler
global climate in the fourth and fifth centuries, was a driving factor in the instigation of the
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barbarian migrations against and into the Roman world.28 Supporting his unique analysis,
Harper brings to bear a battery of environmental and biological studies on subjects ranging from
ice cores and tree rings to critical viruses and pathogens common in the Mediterranean world of
the fourth and fifth centuries, not infrequently noting their general and specific impacts on
historical events such as Attila’s invasion of Italy having been blunted by disease—possibly
malaria.29 While the focus of his history is on the general developments which ultimately
produced the Western Empire’s destruction, his perspective of late antique climate change,
together with a limited overview of affairs on the Danube in his second chapter and sporadically
over book’s pages make The Fate of Rome a welcome, if minor, addition to the historiography of
the Danube frontier.
One further recent publication of interest is Michael Schmitz’ pointedly-named The
Danube Frontier (2019). Despite the pointed title, this book, while original, detailed, and
layman-oriented, far from covers the whole history of its title’s namesake. Instead, following a
preliminary chapter detailing the advancement of Roman forces into the Balkans of the last three
centuries BC, the book focusses solely on the process of securing the Balkans up to the Danube
and into Dacia from the times of Octavian to the close of the Marcomannic Wars in the late
second century AD.30 Given that this book is the final addition to the seven-book series The
Roman Conquests, the narrative’s abrupt cutoff in the AD 180s is scarcely surprising, as
thereafter the Empire experienced little lasting advancement beyond the river’s northern shore.
Thus, halting well before the frontier’s waning years, The Danube Frontier presents a lively
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invitation to engage in the honest inquiry as to the nature of the northern frontier, whose field of
historical potential spans a breadth as wide as Pannonia and a depth as deep as the Danube.
Overall, while recent historiography has offered a wealth of new information on the
various barbarian peoples beyond the Danube, as well as on the imperial frontier’s early years,
the history behind its occupation, operation, relations with major conflicts and other imperial
affairs, and ultimate destruction in the fifth century has yet to be adequately addressed. By the
late fifth century, the landscape along the Roman Empire’s Danube frontier—bustling with
commerce, legionary movements, and political attention little more than a half-century before—
would lie pockmarked with scarcely inhabited ruins of the civilization which had for centuries
previous taken root there. The goal of this study is to bridge the gap in Roman frontier history
by synthesizing a narrative from the AD 370s to the campaigns of Attila, discussing the
neighboring barbarous cultures, important conflicts, and local developments along the Roman
Empire’s greatest frontier that influenced its eventual destruction.
The first chapter begins with an abbreviated overview of the Danube’s structure and
history from the region’s occupation in the first centuries BC and AD to the close of the RomanGothic War of 376-382, set in parallel with the developments in the contemporary and future
enemies of Rome in the European barbaricum beyond the river. The Goths are of particular
interest, as their migration from the vicinity of the Baltic Sea southeastwards into the Pontic
Steppe, and once more into the Pannonian and Romanian Plains bordering the Roman Danube,
provided important context to Roman operations along the river from the mid-second century
onwards. Reactionary to the arrival of the Hunnic Horde from the Central Asian steppes in the
late 360s and 370s, the latter Gothic migration saw the immigration of several tens of thousands
of Goths into the Roman provinces along the river. Mismanagement of foreign refugees
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immigrating into the Roman Empire from this westward procession by imperial authorities,
coupled with the bulk of Roman field forces not being present near the Danube as they typically
were, led to a series of climactic Roman defeats, most notably at Adrianople (Hadrianopolis) and
Thessaloniki (Salonica), for the already stretched imperial military, and portended ill for the
Danube frontier in the following decades. At the end of the Gothic War in 382, the remaining
Gothic forces were settled as an imperial client (‘foedus’) within the Empire along the Lower
Danube, though they would not remain loyal to the emperors for long.
Chapter two discusses the Goth’s further exploits under Alaric against the Empire and its
forces from their revolt in 395 onwards, serving, as many Romans feared they would, as a
destabilizing influence in the Roman Balkans and along the Danube. Meanwhile, the Huns
continued to advance into Europe, settling throughout the Pontic Steppe and the eastern
Pannonian Plain, destabilizing vast tracts of the riverine frontier and laying the foundations for a
loss of Roman control over the Pannonian provinces within a few decades. The breakdown of
Roman power in Pannonia, by far the most remote region of the Danube frontier, served as a
bridgehead for hostile barbarian peoples to penetrate the Empire’s defenses and invade its more
prosperous interior. By the late 390s, mounting pressure on the frontier extended to the Upper
Danube bordering on southern Germania as the Huns and their subjects moved westwards. As
the Western Romans diverted increasing amounts of their increasingly limited resources to hold
the Middle and Upper Danube over the early 400s, Alaric and his forces arose to devastate the
undefended territories of northern Italia, enabling in turn the barbarian crossings of the Rhine in
406 and their overrunning of Roman Gaul over the following years, the loss of Britannia in 410,
and finally the sack of Rome in the same year.
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While the 410s, and to a lesser extent the 420s, are relatively quiet periods in extant
primary sources, the Danube frontier was far from inactive. Chapter three discusses the
barbarian—predominantly Hunnic—invasions of the East Roman Empire, the role of Danube
frontier in the midst of such encounters, and the frontier’s gradual decline and ultimate
destruction between the 420s and Attila’s last invasion of the East in 447. Between the late 390s
and the 420s, Hunnic tribes along the Danube’s northern shore gradually agglomerated into
regional confederacies led by one or more chieftains, culminating in the expansive Hunnic
realms of Ruga and his brother Octar in the 420s. After the former kings’ deaths in the early
430s, the infamous Attila the Hun—the “Scourge of God”—and his brother Bleda, nephews of
the late Hunnic kings, claimed the Hunnic throne and steadily advanced their influence in the
Eastern and Western Roman Empires, subjecting the Danube frontier and its keepers to
increasing external pressure. Facilitating the breakdown of the riverine frontier’s integrity,
Aetius, supreme commander of Western Roman forces, relinquished control of a sizable piece of
Roman Pannonia to the Huns as a recompense for their support in internal Western Roman
political conflicts, severing the Upper and Lower Danube, and interposing an irreconcilable void
in the Danube Limes that their organization was not designed nor able to accommodate. Using
this area in the Pannonian Plain as a springboard and exploiting the distractions various foreign
wars had provided for Theodosius II’s regime, Attila and his forces launched two major
campaigns into the Eastern Roman Empire in 441-442 and 447, the latter of which finally
destroying the Roman Danube, putting a resolute end to the region’s major fortifications, urban
centers, and Constantinopolitan administration. Never again would the Romans see the lasting
entrenchment of the Empire’s frontier along this once-prosperous frontier region.
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Chapter 1: Destabilization of the Danube Frontier, Roman Conquest—A.D. 382
Here force and hardy deeds of blood prevail;
There languid pleasure sighs in every gale.
Oft o'er the trembling nations from afar
Has Scythia breathed the living cloud of war;
And, where the deluge burst, with sweepy sway
Their arms, their kings, their gods were rolled away.
As oft have issued, host impelling host,
The blue-eyed myriads from the Baltic coast.
The prostrate south to the destroyer yields
Her boasted titles and her golden fields…—Thomas Gray

O

n August 9, 378, an estimated two-thirds of the Eastern Roman field army lay dead
amidst the blood-drenched hinterlands a few hours’ march from the city walls of

Hadrianopolis.31 Eastern Roman Emperor Valens and many of his chief aides and commanders
were among them, all having fallen to a coalition of Goths from beyond the Danube that had less
than a decade before bent the knee to Roman supremacy on the northern frontier. Despite their
Gothic adversary’s failure to seize Hadrianopolis, a major economic and governmental center in
the Balkans, in the wake of the climactic Roman defeat—the greatest since 260 at the Battle of
Edessa—the Battle of Hadrianopolis has often been ascribed as a major turning point in Roman
history beginning the Empire’s protracted decline and fall over the proceeding century.32
However, unlike at the arguably larger catastrophe at Edessa, wherein the Persian Empire, which
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the Romans regarded as a long-standing regional threat and a somewhat civilized rival among
their myriad neighbors, had successfully killed or captured over sixty thousand troops and
Emperor Valerian himself, the defeat at Hadrianopolis demonstrated that the barbarous, often
nomadic peoples along the length of the Danube had matured sufficiently to endanger Roman
control of the Empire’s northern frontier.33 It behooves us, then, to briefly explain the rather
humble origins of the Goths and how they rose to prominence and eventual victory in such an
astonishing manner.
By the late fourth century, the presence of Germanic peoples on Rome’s periphery was
anything but new. Their origins, while impossible to discern with certainty, traditionally lie in
the vicinity of the Baltic Sea.34 Their collective migration southwards into Central and Eastern
Europe took place over two distinct periods.35 The first migration (1000 BC – 200 BC),
originating in the Baltic lands between the Elbe and the Oder, produced the Germanic tribes that
would eventually settle throughout the lands of Germania, the name for which, as Tacitus
recounts, was derived from the original name of the Belgic Tungri in the north of Gaul: the
‘Germani.’36 The Romans began to encounter them in the last centuries BC on the Republic’s
Alpine frontier, and halted their movement towards Roman and Roman-aligned territory in the
Alps and Transalpine Gaul along the Rhine through Caesar’s Gaulic Wars (58-51 BC), as
Tacitus records:
Amongst the people of Germany, I would not reckon those who occupy the lands which
are under decimation, though they be such as dwell beyond the Rhine and the Danube.
By several worthless and vagabond Gauls, and such as poverty rendered daring, that
region was seized as one belonging to no certain possessor: afterwards it became a skirt
of the Empire and part of a province [initially Gaul, later Germania Inferior and
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Germania Superior], upon the enlargement of our bounds and the extending of our
garrisons and frontier.37
As they approached and the Roman occupied regions along the Rhine and, eventually, the
Upper Danube, the inhabitants of Germania slowly settled, adopting a semi-sedentary mode of
living within the condensed living space and densely forested terrain, relinquishing their
migratory origins.38 This led the Romans to focusing on Europe’s other great river as an
imperial frontier first. Caesar’s Gallic Wars had advanced the Roman presence to the Rhine and
Augustus planned to continue the offensive to Elbe from 6 AD onwards, integrating Germania
and its innumerable tribes into Rome’s burgeoning empire.39 However, after the Great Illyrian
Revolt (6-9 AD) and Arminius’ ambush of Publius Varus’ legions at the Battle of Teutoburg
Forest (AD 9) incurred so great a loss of materiel and manpower to Augustus’ ambitions, the
Germanic conquest was postponed indefinitely.40 Despite later Roman attempts to regain the
initiative on the peripheries of Germania, the imperial presence grounded on the Rhine and
Upper Danube and steadily transformed into a fixed defensive border.
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The second Germanic migration (600 BC – AD 200), originating in the lowlands between
the Oder and Vistula, if not in Scandinavia beyond the Southern Baltic as Jordanes suggests, laid
the foundation of the Gothic Germans.41 Whereas the inhabitants of Germania gradually adopted
sedentism and agriculture, binding them to the same locales throughout much of the Roman
Empire’s history, the vast plains and steppes of Eastern Europe, bounded to the south by the
Carpathians and Euxine Sea in the southwest and southeast, would enable the Goths to maintain
and perpetuate their nomadic way of life as they migrated.42 Jordanes recounts that the Goths
settled in a particularly rich sector of Scythia they referred to as “Oium,” not far from Lake
Maeotis before gradually dominating the region.43 By the close of the second century, the Goths
had superseded much of the native Scythian and Sarmatian tribes there and began the gradual
expansion into Dacia, the Pontic Steppe, and the periphery of Roman influence on the Euxine
coast and Lower Danube, laying the groundwork for them to play a central role in the events of
the third and fourth centuries.
While the early Goths were still migrating, a new pattern of tribal organization began to
emerge among their more-settled cousins in Germania. In the first and early second centuries,
the Germanic peoples along the Danube existed as diminutive tribal polities, many of which
maintained to varying extents mercantile or political relations with the Empire.44 Many of these
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small groups could be were subjected to Roman suzerainty as imperial “foederati,” client tribes
subsidized and guaranteed by Rome in exchange for manpower to maintain the legions and the
passive service as an outer barrier on the peripheries of Roman influence.45 The latter service
was critical to the early Empire, as the first permanent establishments of the rigid defensive
infrastructure, or ‘limes,’ would not come into being at the earliest until well into the second
century.46 The sporadic raids of hostile tribes in early imperial history, typically characterized by
poorly disciplined light footmen, could often be repulsed without extraordinary difficulty by
their Roman counterparts along the Danube. However, by the third and fourth centuries,
numerous tribes had congregated into powerful tribal confederacies—the Alamanni, Franks,
Lombards, Saxons, Burgundians, etc.—capable of fielding far greater forces to weigh against the
Roman frontier.47 Luttwak attributes this development in part to the shared history of adversity
against the Romans, stating:
Having for so long confronted a single adversary whose culture had infiltrated all their
separate lives, different barbarian groups found a common basis for action against the
empire. It became much harder for Roman diplomacy to contrive divisions among men
who now had much in common.48
These groups were not perfectly united; many of their constituent tribes fought with one another
for dominance in a given area or within the hierarchy of the confederacy.49 Nevertheless, their
potential collective power remained a considerable threat to the Empire’s European frontiers
when they moved in unison.
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Growing mercantile exchange across the frontier also drove the establishment of
conglomerate German states. As the frontier coalesced and the number of frontier fortifications
increased, barbarian tribes in the hinterlands of Germania, Carpathia, and Scythia beyond the
Danube engaged in a proportionally increasing measure of trade with the Romans. Roman
merchants, regularly operating in the vicinity of Danube fortifications and townships, acted as
the primary middlemen for ferrying various goods in and out of the Empire and maintained the
dominance of the Roman trade throughout Scythia, Carpathia, Germania, and the Southern
Baltic.50 Even before they made direct contact with the Roman Empire, the Goths also actively
engaged with the Roman trade; as they established themselves in Scythia, they maintained trade
routes along the Dnieper between their new dwellings in Scythia and their former homeland
around the Baltic and northern Germania by which they could indirectly access the flow of
imperial goods from Gaul, Italia, and the Danube provinces.51 Mercantile activity reached its
height in the second and early third centuries, particularly between the reigns of Nerva and
Antoninus Pius, eventually culminating in the Gothic takeover of the Greek trade ports of Olbia,
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Tyras, and others along the Euxine coast in the 230s, around the time of Severus Alexander’s
assassination on the Rhine and the initiation of the Third Century Crisis.52 Gothic civil centers in
Scythia, both those which they subjugated and of their own construction, would serve as
important bases of operation for conducting trade with and launching limited offensives into the
wealthy Eastern Roman provinces in the third and fourth centuries.
As the Goths dominated Scythia, geography and their semi-nomadic tendencies gradually
emphasized divisions within the corporate Gothic demographic, producing large subdivisions
comparable in size and strength to their federating counterparts in the west. The Thervingi,
bounded by the Carpathian Mountains, Euxine, and the Lower Danube, dwelt around and west of
Dniester and as far south as the Romanian Plain.53 The Greuthungi, comprising the Gothic
presence East of the Dniester, gradually expanded further east and north of Oium.54 It would be
from Greuthungi stock that the semi-legendary Gothic king Ermanric would arise to “subdue
many warlike peoples” whose kingdom would eventually span the breadth of European Scythia
from the close of the third century to the beginning of the Roman-Gothic War of 376-382, and
whose reign would allegedly endure for an extraordinary breadth of time—as Jordanes claims,
about 110 years.55 Only with the approach of the Huns in the late 360s and 370s would the
developing Gothic nations north of the Euxine Sea and the Lower Danube be forced to collide so
precipitously with their Roman neighbors along and behind the river frontier.
By the beginning of the third century, the Roman frontier boasted an entrenched, yet
increasingly unstable control of the imperial periphery. The conquest of the frontier began with
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the reign of Augustus and reached its apex in the final years of the Marcomannic Wars (AD 166180), during which time the Danube had assumed its role as the Empire’s primary strategic
vulnerability.56 Whereas Parthia—and later Sassanid Persia—in the east represented a sporadic
regional threat in times of open warfare, and the Rhine and British Isles in the West represented
native threats changing much more lethargically, the Danube presented the Empire with a
permanent threat posed by an endlessly changing abyss of barbarous polities.57
It was during the Marcomannic Wars that the Germanic tribes began to exhibit signs of
inter-tribal unity and a shared sense of awareness for the Empire’s circumstances and their
impact upon its northern frontier. Just after the Roman-Parthian War of 161-166 began, drawing
Roman attention and resources, including numerous vexillationes from the legions of the Lower
Danube provinces, eastwards, so too did the regular battery of the Danube frontier by the
Germans, Sarmatians, Dacians, and others begin.58 At the same time, the migration of the Goths
southeastwards to Scythia along the northern Carpathians applied immense pressure to the
barbarian polities of Eastern Germania and Carpathia.59 It was this critical combination of a
perceptibly weakening static—that is, generally non-aggressive beyond the Danube’s immediate
vicinity—Roman frontier and the external pressures from the East by an openly aggressive
migratory force, as Jordanes describes, which “added to their victories” the Ulmerugi and
Vandals as they traveled, that drove the Germanic tribes along the Danube out of fear to begin

56

Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 167.
Ibid., 158, 166-167.
58
Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 166-167.; Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman
Empire, 1:229-230.; Vexillationes were sizeable detachments of Roman legions numbering between 1,000
and 2,000, typically with a numerical bias towards infantry. They were used increasingly in the mid- to late
Empire as a rapidly deployable force able to function within a larger combat zone (e.g., a section of the
Danube Frontier), while the main body of its parent legion remained in a designated castra (legionary
fortress) along one the Empire’s frontiers.; Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, 143.
59
Peter Heather, Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010.), 103-107.
57

26

both their inter-tribal collaboration and their collective action against Rome.60 A very similar
process would occur among the Goths less than two centuries later as the Hunnic Horde
advanced into Europe.
Nevertheless, by 180, having reallocated the bulk of its forces to the troubled frontier, the
Empire boasted firm control over not only the entire course of the Danube, but also Dacia,
conquered by Trajan in 105-106, and Aurelius’ conquests north of the Middle Danube,
“Sarmatia” and “Marcomannia,” which he wished to organize into proper provinces over the late
170s.61 However, as Avidius Cassius rose in revolt in the East in 175, forcing him to divert
military resources east to handle the new threat, he would never get the chance.62 Aurelius died
on March 17, 180; Cassius Dio lamented in his Roman History, “Now if Marcus had lived
longer, he would have subdued that entire region.”63 The late emperor’s advisors pleaded with
Commodus, his successor, to further the extraordinary offensive—the first campaign promising
major trans-Danubian gains since Trajan’s Dacian Wars and a considerable interruption to the
federation of the Germanic tribes—“but,” as Cassius Dio notes, “their suggestions and counsels
Commodus rejected, and after making a truce with the barbarians he hastened to Rome; for he
hated all exertion and craved the comfortable life of the city.”64
As Aurelius’ conquests were quietly subsumed back into the Germanic barbaricum
between the 180s and 230s, the oncoming third century represented a dramatic shift in frontier
policy. The slow economic growth and integration of the Danube provinces into the
Mediterranean World, following the assassination of Alexander Severus in 235, was quickly
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replaced with continual invasions by the increasingly united barbarians beyond the opposing
shore. Imperial policy transitioned from supporting a permeable frontier on the Danube,
permitting open trade and routine political relations—especially the establishment and
maintenance of foederati—with neighboring polities, to enforcing a fixed, monitored boundary
against the shifting barbarous peoples beyond.65 This change over the second and third centuries
is evident in the layout of the Danube Limes.
Over the course of the second century, the legionary garrisons in the hinterlands of the
Danube provinces from Noricum to Moesia were advanced to the shore of the river and were
established in permanent stone “fortresses” (‘castra’) constructed at strategically selected sites
along the river, particularly at the termini of natural river crossings and nearby the mouths of
major tributaries capable of being employed as invasion routes into the Balkan heartlands.66
Before the Third Century Crisis, these emplacements were meant simply to provide housing to
the legion residing within rather than to serve as active defensive hardpoints for potential
invaders to have to overcome or bypass as they advanced; the true defensive infrastructure of the
Danube Limes at this point lay in the Roman road network, which connected the frontier with the
logistical and economic network of the Empire and enabled routine overland patrols.67 Along
the roadways, watchtowers, fortlets, and signal stations (‘castella’) were erected at regular
intervals between distant castra to keep surveillance over the river and its opposing shore and
facilitate rapid communication.68 Additionally, the effectiveness of Roman intelligence and
surveillance along the river was greatly enhanced by naval patrols, the Classis Pannonica and
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Moesica, present along the Danube since the reign of Augustus, based out of small dockyards
built into the chain of frontier fortifications.69
This infrastructure, however, was meant to provide passive defensive effect for the
frontier, rather than actively defending against assailing barbarians.70 The limes were meant to
serve as the support network for mobile Roman forces concentrated from reserves along the river
front and the hinterlands of the Danube provinces as they offensively engaged with hostiles
beyond the Danube.71 Furthermore, the limes as they were prior to the Third Century Crisis
served as a simultaneously physical and psychological barrier to partially-Romanized locals in
the Danube provinces; it was a reminder of their residency within the Empire and reinforced
their separation from their barbarous kin beyond the river.72 In principle, the concept of the
frontier as a boon to the process of assimilating barbarians was present until the very end of
Roman control over the region in the fifth century, but its effect was often drastically hampered
when the frontier’s integrity was on a low ebb as during periods of internal calamity.
As the order and prosperity of the Pax Romana devolved into sanguinary chaos between
the death of Marcus Aurelius and the beginning of the Third Century Crisis, wherein imperial
resources and manpower were diverted from the frontier to brewing civil wars, barbarian hosts
frequently breached the frontier and repeatedly raided the Upper Balkans so thoroughly as to
lead Eutropius to ascribe the land as “depopulated.”73 These barbarian offensives, however,
revealed critical structural weaknesses in the Danube Limes. Spanning over 1,700 miles,
concentrations of Roman defenders were necessarily spread thin; conversely, the offending
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barbarians, whose hosts could number by the third and fourth centuries well into the thousands,
naturally concentrated their entire forces against singular points on the frontier.74 Additionally,
the hinterlands south of the river were largely devoid of major urban centers able to reinforce the
scattered defenses along the river or hold invading forces long enough for a relief force to arrive
from elsewhere in the Empire.75 At the same time, Roman field armies were often well out of
reach to shore up the frontier troops in the event of a major invasion, not infrequently being
withdrawn from their posts to serve the reigning emperor or imperial pretenders.76
In the midst of the Empire’s chaotic Third Century Crisis, Aurelian, “born of a humble
family at Sirmium [on the Danube],” rose through the ranks of the defensive forces on the
Danube, gaining an intimate awareness of the region’s the strategic importance.77 After the
death of emperor Claudius Gothicus, his troops hailed his brother, Marcus Quintillus, as
emperor, after which the Senate swiftly followed suit.78 Yet, after around seventeen days in
office, Quintillus died, possibly having lost favor with the Danube legions, who instead
appointed Aurelian as their new emperor.79 Prioritizing the security of the Empire’s most
unstable frontier, he spent the first two years of his restorative reign prudently securing northern
Italia and the Upper Danube, expelling Vandals, Sarmatians, Marcomanni and others invading
through the Alps, though only so far as was necessary to rout them for long enough to recover
the rebelling territories of Palmyra and Gaul between 272 and 275.80 Given how far the
barbarians had advanced into the Balkans and Italia while imperial forces were engaged
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elsewhere, Aurelian commissioned the establishment of a vast ring of walls and turrets around
Rome, known thereafter as the ‘Aurelian Walls,’ the likes of which would in the coming century
become increasingly common around the Empire, especially in the Rhine and Danube
provinces.81
However, Aurelian’s restoration of the Empire, legionary casualties and depopulation of
the riparian provinces aside, cost the Romans a heavy price on their Danube frontier. Dacia,
having been repeatedly raided on all sides from the beginning of the Crisis, was abandoned by
the Empire by the end of Aurelian’s reign.82 Its continued defense proved too costly in light of
the Empire’s already exasperated manpower reserves, strapped finances, and more imposing
threats in Palmyra and Gaul. Much of Dacia’s Roman and Romanized populace was evacuated
south of the Danube to a new ‘Dacia’ carved from Moesia Superior and Inferior, later divided
under Diocletian into ‘Dacia Ripensis’ directly on the Danube and ‘Dacia Mediterranea’ to its
south, expectant of a Roman reconquest that would never materialize; as Eutropius later
recounts,
The Roman citizens, removed from the town and lands of Dacia, he settled in the interior
of Moesia, calling that ‘Dacia’ which now divides the two Moesiae, and which is on the
right hand of the Danube as it runs to the sea, whereas Dacia was previously on the left.83
Instead, in the absence of Roman opposition, the Thervingi and Vandals moved into Dacia
between the 270s and 290s, pressuring the remaining Sarmatians, Carpi, Bastarnae, and other
smaller groups in the region against the Roman frontier.
The withdrawal from Dacia, coupled with his immediate successors Tacitus and
Florianus, each reigning as emperor for mere months, not having the time or opportunity to
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maintain Roman momentum on the frontiers, enabled barbarian hostilities along the Rhine and
Danube to steadily resume between 276 and 280.84 Instead of permitting the frontier to be
overrun again, Emperor Probus, ascending the throne in the summer of 276, reasserted not only
Rome’s preeminence on the Rhine and Danube frontiers as temporarily recovered during
Aurelian’s reign, but elevated the integrity of the frontiers to their pre-Third Century Crisis
stature. By conducting numerous wars along the Rhine and Danube, he reestablished the old
practices of both foederati relationships with various Germanic tribes, some among them even
belonging to larger federative Germanic peoples, as well as routine Roman preemptive
offensives into the barbaricum.85 In so doing, he reintegrated numerous rural communities and
barren hinterlands along the frontiers, throughout the latter of which he ordered his troops to
plant vineyards—seeking to keep them too busy to plot a rebellion similar to those which saw the
overthrow of his predecessors—in the efforts of invigorating lost economic potential.86
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However, his most enduring precedent lay in the practice of settling large numbers of
barbarians within the Empire behind and along its frontiers.87 The frontier conflicts of the Third
Century damaged and destroyed numerous settlements and minor fortifications along the
Danube, creating gaps in the Roman defensive line; by settling large barbarian groups within the
imperial frontier, Probus aimed to solve both the problem of barbarian hostilities and the
weaknesses of the Danube Limes at the same time.88 Additionally, these resettled barbarians, as
they were gradually assimilated, could fill in the rugged hinterlands of the Rhine and Danube to
provide deep logistical support to the Empire’s immediate defense, as well as taxes and
manpower for governmental and military affairs.
Probus’ policy offered his successors a profoundly useful secondary tool for maintaining
the Empire’s European frontier, and some accounts of its early employment during his reign
have survived in primary sources. In addition to several smaller groups of Germans, Sarmatians,
Carpi, and others, the Historia Augusta records that Probus settled approximately 100,000
Bastarnae, a group that had plagued Roman efforts at conquering the Balkans and subduing the
Danube for centuries, in the heavily-Romanized province of Thrace; even when other smaller
groups of recently settled barbarians arose as “brigands” to be quashed by Roman detachments,
the Bastarnae remained loyal to their adoptive emperor.89
Eutropius makes mention of a second major settlement of Bastarnae by Diocletian not
long after his engagements with Narseh, King of Persia, which places it in the mid- to late290s.90 Additionally, the Carpi, having harassed the Lower Danube since the 230s and having
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been repeatedly defeated throughout the Third Century, were resolutely crushed and largely
resettled within the Empire under the campaigns of Diocletian in the late 290s and Constantine in
318.91 In both cases, after a single generation, the Bastarnae and Carpi almost completely vanish
from written accounts, likely having assimilated fully enough into Roman society as to be
scarcely distinguishable from native born Romans along the Danube and throughout the Balkan
provinces.92 Aurelius Victor later wrote of the latter, “the Marcomanni were slaughtered and the
whole nation of the Carpi was transferred to our soil, where some of them had already been
settled from the time of Aurelian.”93 For over a century after his death in 284, Probus’ method of
barbarian resettlement would see the integration of innumerable smaller bands from beyond the
frontier into Roman territories.
Complimenting Probus’ new frontier policy, his successors set about radically updating
the limes and the operational structure of the military. Between Diocletian and Constantine, the
Roman army gradually segregated into two distinct bodies: the ‘limitanei’ constituted the frontier
forces dedicated to holding the imperial borderlands along the limes, whereas the ‘comitatenses’
were the main field armies, typically commanded by the reigning emperor, constituted by partial
or whole legions and their auxiliaries.94 This format would remain in place to the fall of the
West in 476 and well beyond, laying an important part of the groundwork for Byzantine tactics
and strategy from the fifth century onwards.95
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Diocletian, already famed throughout the Empire’s interior for his governmental and
monetary reforms, undertook several construction efforts along the Empire’s frontiers, especially
the Danube, and implemented a series of policies dictating the nature of their management.96
The old fortresses and encampments along the frontier were expanded and reconstructed, the
main castra receiving massive concave bastions, dedicated artillery, and higher walls, which,
unlike the low walls of the previous model castra, supported broad combat platforms at the top.97
The Romans had observed that many of their barbarian neighbors, most notably the Goths, did
not possess the technological or tactical understanding of how to conduct effective sieges of
fortified strongholds; increasing the defensibility of static fortifications therefore served as both a
weighty deterrence against and a severe obstacle for barbarian incursions.98 Complementing the
refurbished fortresses, road forts along major routes of travel and rural fortlets were vigorously
built throughout the Danube provinces.99 Even advance forts, largely unseen since before the
Third Century Crisis, and fortified landing stages were erected on the opposing side of the river
in critical areas.100 Galerius, Constantine, Constantius II, and Valentinian, among others, also
occasionally undertook additional construction efforts on the Danube in the early to mid-fourth
century; in 364, Valentinian directed Tautomedes, the governor of Dacia Ripensis to, “annually
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construct towers in suitable places” in addition to repairing and maintaining those already extant
and in service.101
Additionally, as Roman units on the frontier entrenched themselves, many of the original
castra built over the second and third centuries had become the nuclei of large civilian
settlements, known as ‘canabae.’102 While many of these sizable townships were fortified with
walls and redoubts as their castra were, this development had the effect of tying troops to a
certain area, as their departure to serve in the Empire’s interior or beyond the frontier would
leave their families increasingly vulnerable.103 While limiting strategic options for regional
commanders, regionalization of the limitanei at least reduced the risk for internal disruptions,
though not direct orders from regional authorities, to swiftly compromise the limes.
Nevertheless, the remarkable accomplishments of Aurelian, Probus, and Diocletian did
not unilaterally solve the profound weaknesses of the frontier. Instead, almost every
Constantinian and Valentinianic emperor whose reign lasted more than a year spent considerable
time on campaign along the Danube frontier, micromanaging the Empire’s foreign relations with
those along its northern frontier more so than any other. While unable to maintain peace
throughout the Upper Balkans, continual punitive campaigns, revolving treaties, and ongoing
construction and reconstruction efforts set at maintaining and improving upon the frontier’s
infrastructure, at least preserve the status quo on the Empire’s northern periphery and peace in
the Empire’s core provinces. The corresponding status quo of the European barbaricum
remained relatively static but well beyond the Empire’s ability to control.
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The existing balance of power between the Romans and their ever-shifting European
neighbors, albeit pockmarked by sporadic raids into Moesia, Pannonia, and Rhaetia, remained
relatively stable until the early 370s when, emerging from the vast steppes of Central Asia, the
Hunnic Horde set foot on European soil. Sweeping westwards, the Huns quickly overran the
Alans, Greuthungi, and Sarmatians among others dwelling north of the Euxine Sea, migrating as
far as the Pannonian Plain by the mid-380s.104 The Gothic kingdom of Ermanric, whatever its
ultimate extent, was demolished and its holdings subjected to Hunnic dominance; Ammianus
later wrote,
He was astonished at the violence of this sudden tempest, and although, like a prince
whose power was well established he long attempted to hold his ground, he was at last
overpowered by a dread of the evils impending over his country, which were exaggerated
by common report, till he terminated his fear of great danger by a voluntary death.105
As they expanded westward, the Huns’ reputation of ruthless ferocity preceded them.
They overwhelmed Gothic Scythia and approached the northern bounds of the Romanian Plain
in 375 and early 376.106 The Thervingi residing there, pressured in much the same way their
ancestors had pressured the Germanic tribes on the Middle and Upper Danube before and during
the Marcomannic Wars, steadily amassed on the Lower Danube across from Durostorum and
appealed to Emperor Valens for admission into the Empire.107 As Probus’ policy of settling
large numbers of barbarians within the Empire was still an integral facet of late imperial frontier
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policy, the Visigothic request and its promise of additional manpower for the Eastern Roman
army must have appeared somewhat enticing to two reasons.
Firstly, at the time of their request, Valens was in Syria waging a major war against
Persia over the suzerainty of Armenia.108 After the Third Century Crisis, manpower proved
increasingly difficult to come by during major wars far from the eastern metropole of
Constantinople (Constantinopolis) and Empire’s core provinces, and the Goths had as a
condition of their entry into the Empire offered a force of their own number as disposable
manpower.109 As the Goths would scarcely have anywhere to flee if they rebelled, and as they
had over the previous two centuries learned to fight in the saddle from their nomadic neighbors,
particularly the Sarmatians and Alans, Gothic contingents in his retinue would be extremely
advantageous against his Persian adversaries.110
Secondly, despite frequent punitive campaigns beyond the Danube over the previous
half-century, border skirmishes and raids had nevertheless taken a weighty toll on the frontier
troops stationed along the Danube’s southern shore. In 375, mere months before the Goths
would make their request, two elite legions of the Moesian and Pannonian limes under the
command of Equitius, Emperor Valentinian’s magister militum of Illyricum, were lost
combatting an offending force of Sarmatians in Pannonia.111 The loss of such experienced
forces—outlying instances in a decades-long period of the continual accrual of casualties—
would have been fresh in the minds of Roman officers and officials as the Visigoths began to
amass, and only elevated the need for fresh recruits on the Danube. Ammianus himself
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acknowledged the worrisome state of the frontier, writing, “At that time the defenses of our
provinces were much exposed, and the armies of barbarians spread over them like the lava of
Mount Etna.”112 At the same time, in the case of Roman refusal, the frontier defenses in the area
were likely not strong enough to repulse the Goths in the event of a forced crossing, though
Durostorum, one of the few castra on the Lower Danube, was well fortified and could provide
the immediate surroundings with a safe haven in such an event.113
As the permittance of a barbarian population to enter the Empire was a matter disposed
with solely at the emperor’s discretion, negotiations must have taken several months.114
Travelling along the Roman roads, unladen couriers could manage in optimum conditions no
more than fifty miles each day on horseback, though such speeds were uncommon and no
travelling baggage train or stock of provisions could keep pace.115 As a round trip from
Durostorum to Valens’ emplacement in Syria constituted over 1,200 miles of riding, the
emperor’s reply could not have reached the frontier until the autumn of 376.116 As no
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contradictory primary sources are mentioned, the Goths’ collective behavior in the meantime
must have been relatively tractable, given it would be a foremost factor in the Roman decision
regarding their entry into the Empire.117 The crowd of Gothic refugees were almost certainly not
a homogenous collective, being composed of a slew of distinct tribes and clans; Alavivus and
Fritigern, the only Gothic leaders of sufficient consequence among the Thervingi to appear in
contemporary sources by name, were likely solely leaders of large tribes within the growing
throng. Valens’ decision to grant the Goths their request arrived sometime around the autumn of
376 permitting tens of thousands of desperate Gothic men, women, and children to cross the
Danube into the Roman Balkans unopposed.118 Ammianus paints a grim scene:
Having obtained permission of the emperor to cross the Danube and to cultivate some
districts in Thrace, they crossed the stream day and night, without ceasing, embarking in
troops on board ships and rafts, and canoes made of the hollow trunks of trees, in which
enterprise, as the Danube is the most difficult of all rivers to navigate, and was at that
time swollen with continual rains, a great many were drowned, who, because they were
too numerous for the vessels, tried to swim across, and in spite of all their exertions were
swept away by the stream.119
Following this event, the crossing lasting for several days, the Goths were contained in an
improvised camp outside of Durostorum.120 For the time being, as their safe presence within the
Empire was largely dependent upon their quiescence to Roman authority, the refugees could only
sustain themselves on what the Romans gave them. Insufficient Roman support, exhibited by
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inadequate food shipments and exacerbated by the outbreak of disease, sowed the seeds of unrest
among the refugees; given the crossing had happened after the harvest and most food for the
winter season had already been gathered into walled towns and fortified strongholds, those
managing the Goths, Lupicinus, a comes et militaris and commander of Lower Danube, and
Maximus, dux of either Moesia or Scythia, were likely struggling to acquire sufficient food for
them.121
It was amidst this already tense setting that, as Ammianus records, “those detested
generals conceived the idea of a most disgraceful traffic: and having collected hounds from all
quarters with the most insatiable rapacity, they exchanged them for an equal number of slaves,
among whom were several sons of men of noble birth.”122 Following several increasingly
restless months of internment, Lupicinus and Maximus elected to escort them directly
southwards to Marcianople where they could set about effectively distributing them where
necessary along the frontier and throughout the Balkan hinterlands.123
Enabling this procession, not unlike as often occurred during the Third Century Crisis, as
there were no other nearby forces to supervise the Visigoths, the limitanei were pulled from their
posts on the Lower Danube to form the Goths’ escort, greatly weakening the already
overstretched frontier defenses.124 This created enough of a defensive void along the Lower
Danube to permit a sizeable host of Greuthungi under Saphrax and Alatheus, veteran
commanders in combatting the Huns, to quietly penetrate the frontier further downstream fully
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armed and without notable Roman resistance.125 The Thervingi, in close communication with
their Greuthungi brethren both before and after crossing the frontier, deliberately slowed their
progression southwards to permit the force of Saphrax and Alatheus to keep pace.126 Aiding this
process, much of the Greuthungi were mounted. After shadowing the column of Visigoths and
their Roman attendants to Marcianopolis, pillaging segments of the Roman countryside as they
went, the Greuthungi set camp further afield from their fellows and waited for further
developments.127
They would not have to wait for long. Once the mass of Thervingi had encamped a few
miles from Marcianopolis, Lupicinus and Maximus elected to invite Alavivus, Fritigern, and
their attendants to a night of feasting and entertainment in the city. The details as to what exactly
transpired that night are lost, but following an armed scuffle between a party of Goths, who were
barred from entering the city to purchase food and supplies, and the Roman garrison, Lupicinus
decided to have the Gothic leadership put to death while within the city.128 Nevertheless, Roman
forces botched the collective assassination attempt; while Alavivus appears to have fallen amidst
the chaos, thereafter completely vanishing from the historical record, Fritigern by some means
managed to return to his increasingly agitated people beyond the walls.129 After rejoining his
people, Fritigern committed his people to rebellion and sought to gather as many willing Gothic
volunteers settled in Moesia as possible to his banner:
[Fritigern’s Goths] mounted their horses and fled, in order to kindle wars in many
quarters. ... The whole nation of the Thuringians [Thervingi] became suddenly inflamed
with a desire for war; and among many preparations which seemed to betoken danger, the
standards of war were raised according to custom, and the trumpets poured forth sounds
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of evil omen; while the predatory bands collected in troops, plundering and burning
villages, and throwing everything that came in their way into alarm by their fearful
devastations.130
As the Thervingi took up arms and set about pillaging the local landscape, the Greuthungi under
Alatheus and Saphrax arrived to join them.131 Lupicinus gathered as many Roman troops from
the city garrison and the escort force of limitanei as he was able to bring the rouge barbarians
into subjection, and met them in pitched battle within ten miles from the city center.132 The
following Battle of Marcianopolis was a disaster. Despite the Romans’ resolve, the superior
Gothic numbers charged Lupicinus’ force before they were fully deployed, killing approximately
half their number and entire junior officer corps, seizing their unit standards, and driving the
remainder, including Lupicinus, from the field.133
Equipping themselves with the arms and armor of fallen Romans, though not having the
numbers or technological capabilities to lay siege to Marcianopolis, Fritigern led his forces along
the Roman roads and throughout the Moesian hinterlands east and south of the city.134 Having
bypassed the frontier and dispatched the only Roman force of consequence in the region, the
Goths were free to spread out and plunder the fertile agrarian countryside of Moesia Inferior as
they went, and put all they could not take with them to the torch, as Jordanes dismally reports,
“thus, that day put an end to the famine of the Goths and the safety of the Romans, for the Goths
no longer as strangers and pilgrims, but as citizens and lords, began to rule the inhabitants and to
hold in their own right all the northern country as far as the Danube.”135 Taking place not long
after their victory at Marcianopolis, Ammianus describes a brief foray of the Goths south to
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Hadrianopolis, seeking to winter there, but after failing to take the walled and fiercely defended
city by storm, Fritigern:
Perceiving that his men, who were unaccustomed to sieges, were struggling in vain, and
sustaining heavy losses, advised his army to leave a force sufficient to maintain the
blockade, and to depart with the rest, acknowledging their failure, and saying that "He did
not war with stone walls," advising them also to lay waste all the fertile regions around
without any distinction, and to plunder those places which were not defended by any
garrisons.136
Additionally, numerous Roman malcontents, many among them knowledgeable of the Roman
road network and agricultural centers in the Balkans, volunteered with Fritigern’s force, enabling
him to better plan his route of plunder through the provinces in the coming months.137 Having
failed to take Hadrianopolis, the Goths retreated northwards to Moesia to endure the winter.
The effects of the Battle of Marcianopolis along the Danube in particular cannot be
understated. Following the Gothic victory, no Roman reinforcements able to repair and garrison
the limes’ damaged infrastructure existed in the northern Balkans. Furthermore, by virtue of the
Gothic presence in Moesia, directly between Constantinopolis and other major population
centers in the southern Balkans and the Lower Danube, and their having ravaged the region’s
farmlands to sustain themselves, no Eastern Roman force would be able to reestablish the
frontier’s cohesion for the foreseeable future. Much of the Lower Danube was thus virtually left
open to other parties of barbarian refugees and raiders to venture into the Empire without any
formal arrangements having taken place to officiate their status as subjects of the Empire or to
direct them to regions in which the imperial government deemed best to settle them. This
weakness would be exploited by Fritigern to calamitous effect late in the following year.
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By collecting the survivors of the Battle of Marcianopolis, drawing on scattered units of
Roman auxiliaries from elsewhere in the southern Balkans, and receiving a collection of Western
Roman cohorts under the command of Richomer, the Romans formed a substantial, though far
from overwhelming, second army to confront the wandering Goths.138 This force advanced
north beyond the Haemus Mountains and engaged the Goths in Scythia Minor near the end of the
campaign season at ad Salices, ‘[Town] by the Willows;’ the location of this engagement is not
known with certainty, nor the specific sizes of the opposing forces or the order of battle, but the
cost to both parties was considerable.139 In the wake of the inconclusive Battle of the Willows,
the Eastern Roman leadership planned to utilize the remainder of 377 and 378 to starve
Fritigern’s force into submission by withdrawing from Moesia and occupying the few passes of
the Haemus Mountains lining the southern bound of Moesia Inferior.140 In so doing, the Roman
forces cut off Fritigern’s access to the rich farmlands of the Thracian Plain; as the Goths
numbered at least 50,000 men, women, and children and were unable to breach fortified cities to
seize agricultural stockpiles therein, the resources of Moesia Inferior and Scythia Minor would
be unable to sustain the combined Gothic host for more than a year or two. Fritigern therefore
faced a critical decision: either the Goths could retreat back across the Danube to fend for
themselves against the Huns, risk a confrontation in the near future in unsuitable mountain
terrain outside of the campaign season against dug-in Roman defenders, or seek a pitched battle
later in 378 after the Romans had had ample time to regather themselves. In the meantime,
Valens and his staff had been sent word of the affairs in the Balkans, and were preparing to
venture westwards to counter the Gothic threat.
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While the Roman occupation of the mountains dissuaded the Goths from attempting to
venture southwards, their proximity to the partially-collapsed frontier enabled them to
communicate with the barbarians of the Romanian Plain and beyond—before the close of the
year, Fritigern had found an escape to his strategic dilemma. Promising “extensive plunder” in
the rich Roman provinces, a sizeable party of Huns and Alans breached the frontier and joined
the Gothic force.141 As news of this development spread southwards, anticipating a barbarian
force now easily able to overwhelm any single mountain pass and thereby encircle the rest from
the south, Roman leadership elected to withdraw the Roman units in the mountains
southwards.142 In response, the Goths immediately began to migrate southwards towards Thrace.
While most Roman forces guarding the mountains retreated swiftly and successfully,
those holding the easternmost passage along the coastal road south to Dibaltum could not
withdraw in time. A mass of Goths, Huns, and Alans—the combined barbarian cavalry and
Gothic footmen complimenting one another—fell upon the Romans while setting a marching
camp as they withdrew; like the Battle of the Willows, little information exists on the Battle of
Dibaltum, but the Roman force appears to have been utterly destroyed, after which the barbarians
proceeded southwards to sack the undefended city of Dibaltum and other townships in the
region.143 With the Roman blockade along the Haemus range broken, Thrace was open to the
taking from the beginning of 378.
Valens, having brokered an unfavorable though necessary peace with the Persians, set out
on the lengthy journey back to Constantinople in early 378. His reception at the capital was less
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than warm among the city’s inhabitants, given the two years of pillaging the combined barbarian
forces had enjoyed throughout Moesia Inferior, Scythia Minor, and, most recently, the Balkan
agricultural hinterlands of the great city itself.144 He left the city after a mere twelve days and by
June was once again among his field forces beyond the old Constantinian Walls.145 He advanced
his force approximately twenty miles from the city to a private villa at Melantius where his host
could prepare for the coming campaign as Western Roman forces advanced to their aid.146
Likely before the close of 377, Valens and his entourage had received word that Western
Emperor Gratian and veteran forces from the Rhine were mustering to jointly quash the
marauding barbarians.
While a few elite detachments of Western Romans under Richomer had successfully
traversed the Succi Pass to join the Romans in preparation for the Battle of the Willows in the
previous year, the main body of the Western Roman forces proved unable to depart from Gaul.147
The federative barbarians of Germania, particularly the Alamanni, quickly noticed the thinning
lines of Roman defenders manning the Rhine and Upper Danube Limes, and began probing the
frontier for viable points of armed intrusion.148 His forces tied down holding the Rhine and
Upper Danube, Gratian, while still promising to come to Valens aid at the earliest opportunity,
could not meet his colleague’s need for support until well after the summer of 378 had passed.
While residing at Melantius, Valens had received intelligence of a band of Gothic raiders
in the vicinity of Hadrianopolis approximately 120 miles northwest of his position and ordered
an advance column of his forces to ambush them.149 After a swift night attack, the Romans
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easily overwhelming the foragers, Fritigern, sensing the vulnerability of his raiding and foraging
parties, regathered his forces and advanced southwards from the upper bounds of the Thracian
Plain to Hadrianopolis.150 By early autumn, Gratian’s advance forces has wrested control over
the Succi Pass 120 miles northwest of Hadrianopolis, preventing barbarian forces from
advancing into Moesia Superior and the Middle Danube territories beyond, and enabling
Gratian’s force to advance directly to Hadrianopolis along the Via Militaris.151 After the
Westerners’ arrival in the last months of 378, the combined Roman force at Hadrianopolis would
easily outmatch the barbarian host.
Yet while encamped in the southeast of Thrace, Valens received faulty intelligence
denoting the number of hostile combatants to be around 10,000.152 In reality, this number may
have described merely the number of the Thervingi.153 Given this misinformation, from his
perspective Valens’ field army likely well outnumbered his adversary’s combined force.
Additionally, letters depicting and exaggerating the accomplishments of Gratian against the
Germans continued to arrive elevated Valens envy and impatience; unlike Gratian, the eastern
emperor did not have any great victories to his name—a fact only compounded by months before
having to make an unfavorable truce with Persia.154 As he waited for Gratian to arrive, the
morale of his increasingly restless army was waning and the campaign season was moving into
its closing autumn months. In early August, Valens advanced his army to Hadrianopolis,
encamping in the suburbs of the city.155 Ammianus wrote that even Richomer himself arrived to
inform Valens of Gratian’s approach, and “to wait a little while for him that he might share his
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danger, and not rashly face the danger before him single handed.”156 After having discussed the
situation with his command staff, who were themselves divided over the prospect of giving battle
without Western Roman support, sensing an opportunity to bolster his prestige without the
support of his accomplished fellow emperor, Valens ignored Gratian’s pleas and elected to roll
the dice.157
The results were disastrous. The Romans left Hadrianopolis on the morning of August 9
to meet the Gothic host, having marched south to meet them from northern Thrace over the
proceeding weeks, a few miles from the city walls.158 By the afternoon, however, when the two
forces faced one another across an open field, the Romans were not as well prepared for combat
as when they had departed Hadrianopolis; there was rampant hunger through the ranks, as they
had just marched with full equipment around eight miles, and were made to stand continuously
in battle array.159 The heat of summer had been augmented by dust and ash whipped up by the
Goths, as they set local crops ablaze to make the battlefield all the more miserable for their
foes.160 Valens, seeing the weakening state of his troops, relented, seeking to take up Fritigern’s
continual requests for peace.161 Yet, during a hostage exchange, part of the Roman lines
advanced without orders, enkindling the battle which moments before seemed likely to be
avoided.162 The two forces crashed against one another with many perishing in the crush; while
the battle was a stalemate for its first hours, the sudden arrival of the Greuthungi cavalry on the
scene—as to that point they had been raiding the countryside—quickly caused the Roman force
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to buckle from the flanks.163 By the end of the day, between half and three-quarters of the
Eastern Roman field army, its entire command staff, and its emperor fell on the field.164
The Roman defeat at the Battle of Hadrianopolis, while not the last major defeat the
Romans would receive in the Roman-Gothic War, was the climax of a destructive, and ultimately
fruitless, campaign in which the Romans fought themselves to exhaustion. The annihilation of
Lupicinus’ ad hoc force at Marcianopolis, having been composed largely of Lower Danube
limitanei, left the already buckling frontier open to whomever wished to cross into the vulnerable
Balkans. The imposition thereafter of Hunnic and Alanic reinforcements undid the Romans’
defensive strategy in the Haemus Mountains, leading to the devastation of most of the rich
Thracian farmlands and laying the foundations for a crippling loss at Hadrianopolis. In the
immediate aftermath of the climactic battle, the Eastern Roman Empire’s defense, internal and
external, lay in its infrastructure—what was left of the Danube limes, city walls, and isolated
hardpoints such as road forts, watchtowers, and fortified farmhouses—and the scattered troops
and desperate locals defending them, as well as whatever Western Roman forces were able to
attend to the devastated Balkans.
Following their unprecedented victory, and failing to breach fortified Hadrianopolis for a
second time, Fritigern led his forces south along the Via Militaris to the foot of Constantinopolis,
only to be so disheartened by the extensive Constantinian Walls, and by the tendency of the
Arabic warriors manning the defenses to drink the blood of their enemies after having slit their
throats, to return to sacking the rich Thracian countryside.165 After retreating from
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Constantinopolis, a large segment of the Greuthungi under Alatheus and Saphrax, perhaps nearly
all present, separated from the barbarian force. These Goths ventured over the following months
along the Roman roads northwestwards through Illyricum to Pannonia, wherein, likely following
an arrangement with Gratian, they would settle in the hinterlands of the Middle Danube.166
Pannonia was a region already accustomed to the process of assimilating non-Roman
peoples into the Empire, as it already boasted a considerable population of partially Romanized
Vandals, Sarmatians, and other groups from beyond the river, but the settling of another large
body of barbarians in an already inherently unstable region as pressures on the Danube frontier
mounted weakened the province’s integrity more than the Romans likely realized. In the
meantime, over the following two years, Fritigern and the Thervingi ravaged Thrace and
Macedonia before finally being cornered by the newly reconstituted Eastern Roman army under
Theodosius I, Gratian’s replacement for Valens as of January 19, 379, at Salonica only for the
Romans to suffer a second major defeat.167 After this defeat, Gratian resumed control in
subduing the Goths, driving them back to the war-torn lands of Moesia beyond the Haemus over
the following two years and forcing them to sue for peace on October 3, 382.168
The typical peace the Romans enforced throughout the Empire’s history in the wake of a
major victory over the barbarians, usually along or beyond the Rhine and Danube frontiers,
entailed the subjection of barbarous peoples to the will and suzerainty of the Empire as client
states of one form or another, mass enslavement or impressment into the Empire’s agrarian
centers and armed forces, and, in the case of a large population entering the Empire, dispersal
amidst provinces far from the frontier of their nativity to ensure assimilation and dissuade
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revolt.169 The peace deal settled in 382, however, dramatically diverged from standing precedent
and had profound implications for the Danube frontier and the Empire at large going forward.
While the exact stipulations of the agreement are lost to history, Themistius, an aged Roman
orator and rhetorician, preserved the official narrative of the nature of the peace:
We have seen their leaders and chiefs, not making a show of surrendering a tattered
standard, but giving up the weapons and swords with which up to that day they had held
power, and slinging to the king’s [the emperor Theodosius’] knees more tightly than
Thetis, according to Homer, clung to the knees of Zeus when she besought him on her
son’s behalf, until they won a kindly nod and a voice which did not rouse war but was
full of kindness, full of peace, full of benevolence, and the forgiveness of sins.170
The Romans played off the uneasy peace established with Goths in benevolent terms for the sake
of the commoner’s perspective.171 In truth, the Eastern Roman Empire was militarily exhausted
after the defeats at Hadrianopolis and Salonica, and was therefore unable to seek a more typical
retributive response to a barbarous group responsible for such widespread devastation in the
Balkans, the deaths of so many civilians and soldiers alike, and the loss of an emperor on the
field.172
Instead of cutting them down wholesale or settling them as imperial clients beyond the
Danube from whence they came, to arrest the potential for a popular Gothic rebellion for the
time being, the Romans made a critical change to their policy towards the frontier and their
treatment of barbarians. In a combination of the precedent established by Probus and the Roman
policy of seeking the creation of loyal barbarian client states beyond the frontiers, the
Thervingi—and possibly the Greuthungi—would be settled as foedera within the Empire. The
Thervingi were permitted to settle in the Eastern Balkans, particularly the regions of Moesia
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Inferior and Scythia Minor between the Danube frontier and the Haemus to which Roman forces
had concentrated them, while the Greuthungi that split from the barbarian force and ventured to
Pannonia remained in place.173 After they had settled, as with typical Roman foederati
arrangements, the Goths would provide taxes and manpower to the Empire. Gothic manpower in
particular proved increasingly important as the Romans had lost so many troops during the
Gothic War and the pressures on the Roman frontiers only continued to grow. As they were not
broken up and resettled around the Empire, but were instead permitted to settle as whole
populations in regions with only scattered Roman civil centers, both groups of Goths were able
to maintain the integrity of their tribal identities and act with their own distinct wills, either in
obeisance or defiance of their Roman masters, as it suited their ambitions.
The dubious loyalty of the Goths presented the limitanei with a logistical and strategic
dilemma. Instead of merely facing the veritably unending sea of constantly shifting barbarians
beyond the opposing shore, the once-barren hinterlands south of the Lower Danube now
presented the frontier troops with considerable populations of likewise potentially hostile Goths.
The exact same problem, arguably on a lesser scale given the Greuthungi’s smaller number and
the greater number of Roman cities in the region, could be said of the frontier on the Middle
Danube beyond the Iron Gates. This tense status quo remained in place along the Danube for
less than thirteen years before new geopolitical developments within and without the Empire
upset the peace of 382.
After the close of the Gothic War, the Romans hastily repaired and garrisoned vulnerable
tracts of the frontier, but while significant concentrations of disloyal barbarians in Pannonia,
Moesia, and Scythia, along with a temporary shortage of fielded troops in the East, exacerbated
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geographical problems for the Roman Danube and other frontiers, the Empire was still
predominantly sound in its structure.174 Within a few years, the Eastern Roman field army could
be restored to exact a brutal vengeance upon the Empire’s unwelcome Gothic residents,
dispersing the survivors around the Empire to suit its economic and logistical needs. Themistius’
rose-tinted account of forgiveness and fatherly kindness on the part of emperor Theodosius and
the Empire belied the undeniable resentment the Romans bore towards the newcomers. A mere
four years following the peace of 382, a Greuthungi chieftain from beyond the Lower Danube
named Odotheus led a large population of men, women, and children to cross the Roman frontier
as they fled the oncoming Huns; accounts as to the degree of success he and his people had in the
crossing vary, but within days, his host had been soundly defeated, and the Romans dispersed the
survivors throughout Anatolia, particularly in Phrygia, as per their usual fashion.175 Yet as the
Huns continued to advance into Europe, displacing still greater numbers of peoples endemic to
the steppes of Scythia and the forested mountains of Carpathia, the pressure on the Danube
frontier only grew. Having lost so many elite units and needing to rebuild the Eastern Roman
field army from the ground up whilst concurrently maintaining a perilously unstable riverine
frontier against a growing composite barbarian threat from the north and east, the Romans would
never find the opportunity to properly redress the Goths, enabling their internal threat, much like
that of the external Huns, to snowball into ultimately fatal proportions, both for the aging frontier
and the Empire it was established to defend.
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Chapter 2: Decline of the Danube Frontier, A.D. 382—A.D. 420
…the following spring they collected such a large army that the land of the Huns was
swept bare of fighting men and there were five 'thousand' in each legion, each
'thousand' containing thirteen 'hundreds,' and each 'hundred' four times forty men;
and these legions were thirty-three in number. When these troops had assembled,
they rode through the forest which was called Myrkviðr, and which separated the
land of the Huns from that of the Goths…—Saga of Hervör and Heiðrekr

D

uring the Roman-Gothic War of 376-382, while the Goths unilaterally disrupted the
Danube Limes’ defensive integrity, the Huns, having served as their impetus for

crowding upon the Roman Empire’s borders, began to amass in the Pontic Steppe and the fringes
of the Danubian territories. From the perspective of Oescus, Durostorum, or any other castra on
the Danube—let alone Constantinopolis—the thought of this new, barely recognized collection
of various steppe tribes from the ether of Central Asia having such a uniquely deleterious impact
on the Empire’s most critical frontier between the early 370s and the emergence of a unified
Hunnic Empire in the 420s would have been unthinkable. After all, once Fritigern and his forces
had been pacified in 382, the Romans had reclaimed control over the Danube and Theodosius I
was in the process of building a new Eastern Roman army. Nevertheless, in proceeding
westwards, the Huns drove native Gothic, Sarmatian, and Dacian populations into the Empire en
masse, and would follow suit to do so themselves with increasing frequency and ferocity from
the 370s onwards. Between their disorderly migration into Europe to their reemergence as a
tribal empire worthy of rivalling Rome’s supremacy over the European continent, Hunnic
incursions against and beyond the Roman Danube set a dangerous precedent, portending the
destructive nature of future Hunnic affairs in the mid-fifth century.
The dynamic process of Roman-Hunnic relations—hostilities along the Danube gradually
arising as one their recurrent central features—began from the Roman perspective almost
passively. During the Gothic War and the years of recovery which followed it, Greek and
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Roman historians paid the peoples of the steppes beyond the Euxine, the Hunnic newcomers
from beyond the Caspian foremost among them, comparatively scant literary attention, leaving
the subject of their origins a matter of protracted academic debate for posterity.1 Their lack of
knowledge regarding the geographical and tribal layout of the lands to the north and northeast of
the Euxine, was not, however, without precedent. Capturing the Mediterranean perspective on
the region 800 years prior to the Gothic War, Herodotus wrote in his Histories,
With regard to the regions which lie above the country [Scythia] whereof this portion of
my history treats, there is no one who possesses any exact knowledge. Not a single
person can I find who professes to be acquainted with them by actual observation. The
country has no marvels except its rivers, which are larger and more numerous than those
of any other land. These, and the vastness of the great plain, are worthy of note.2
Throughout his limited writings on Scythia, contained mostly in his Histories’ fourth volume,
Herodotus remarked with considerable frequency for the reader’s sake just how little he and his
countrymen truly knew of the vast, sparsely populated steppes on the fringe of the Mediterranean
World. Strabo, composing his Geographica around the turn of the first century AD, paints a
similar picture:
We are acquainted with the mouths of the Don, ... but a small part only of the tract above
the mouths is explored, on account of the severity of the cold, and the destitute state of
the country; the natives are able to endure it, who subsist, like the wandering shepherd
tribes, on the flesh of their animals and on milk, but strangers cannot bear the climate nor
its privations.3
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By the reign of Valens, the Roman perspective of the steppes had become mired in routinized
ignorance, reinforced by an expectation of discovering nothing of note, leaving curiosity as the
sole impetus—and a weak one at that—of any potential expedition into the barren territories
beyond the Euxine. Greco-Roman awareness of the steppes and their inhabitants reached its
limits either in the unsteady writings of foregoing historians and geographers or, more
empirically, the string of ancient Greek trade ports founded between the eight and sixth centuries
BC along the northern shore of the Euxine to facilitate maritime trade with the natives.
As these venerable mercantile cities aged and the steppe peoples with which they traded
steadily supplanted one another over the centuries, the nature of traditional life on the steppes of
Central and Western Asia had changed relatively little. The rugged conditions of the barren
rolling grasslands had so conditioned the disparate tribes that eventually comprised Huns and
their migratory horde that, by the mid-fourth century, they were eminently capable of
overrunning the nations which lay before them on the Pontic Steppe and Central Europe
beyond.4 While the exact migration routes and methods of conquest employed by those
constituting the Hunnic Horde are lost to history, the invasion clearly consisted of two distinct
offensives. The majority of the Horde proceeded directly over the Don River into the territories
of the Greuthungi Kingdom of Ermanric, while a much smaller contingent ventured southwards
across the Straits of Kerch into the Crimea, driving the Goths living there into the mountainous
southwestern quadrant of the peninsula or off of the peninsula altogether via the isthmus in the
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north, before moving across the isthmus themselves to rejoin their countrymen in the westward
advance.5
Most of the once-flourishing trade ports along the northern coasts of the Euxine,
generally loyal to the Roman Empire—though their political orientation depended in part on that
of the peoples inhabiting the Pontic Steppe around them—and representing the northeastern
extreme of its sphere of influence, vanished from the historical record in the years following the
Hunnic invasion of the Gothic territories.6 As they were only lightly defended, having existed on
reasonably amicable terms with their neighbors and trade partners in the Goths, Sarmatians, and
other natives of the Pontic Steppe, and were conspicuously wealthy, they represented undeniably
attractive targets for the Huns as they migrated westwards. Chersonesus, a sizable, fortified
trade hub on the west coast of Crimea, whose fortifications were greatly enhanced by
Valentinian, was one of the few civil centers to survive the arrival of the Huns and the only
township in the Crimea to remain independent of both the Goths and the Huns as Rome’s last
stronghold in the northern Euxine.7
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Chersonesus’ remarkable survival notwithstanding, while the specific dates of their
individual destructions are indeterminable, the loss of the ancient Euxine trade ports represented
the subtle first stage of the Huns’ repulsing Roman power to the Danube. As the Hunnic Horde
thundered into Europe, its leadership occasionally struck alliances with defeated peoples that had
offered especially staunch resistance and folded them into the Horde, such as in the case of the
Alans of the eastern Pontic Steppe; Jordanes wrote, “The Alani also, who were their equals in
battle, but unlike them in civilization, manners, and appearance, they [the Huns] exhausted by
their incessant attacks and subdued.”8 These arrangements were enabled by the structure of the
Horde; effectively a migratory confederacy akin in form to those of Germania, the Horde was
comprised by a large collection of individual tribes and clans.9 Its social and administrative
construction was markedly flexible, able to attach or detach individual tribes as necessary, and
could to muster a much greater host of mounted warriors than any singular tribe.10 Most native
peoples, such as the Thervingi and Greuthungi Goths, Vandals, and Carpi, were however either
brought under Hunnic suzerainty by conquest or driven westwards beyond the Huns’ reach.
Between the early 370s and the mid-380s, while the bulk of the Horde had slowed in the Pontic
Steppe with many of its clans electing to settle in a landscape similar to that from whence they
came, some Hunnic groups would ride further westwards into the Romanian and Pannonian
Plains.
The small band of Huns and Alans that joined Fritigern in the Gothic War demonstrates
that at least some of the Hunnic Horde had successfully reached the Romanian Plain directly
opposite the Lower Danube by 377. Between 377 and 378, several bands of Huns had proceeded
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further westwards, crossing the Carpathian Mountains into the southeast corner of the Pannonian
Plain. Otto Maenchen-Helfen, citing passages in Zosimus’ New History, Ambrose’s De Fide,
and Theodoret’s Ecclesiastical History, has argued that these pathfinding tribes of the Hunnic
Horde, having entered the Pannonian Plain beyond the Danube, forcibly drove whole barbarian
populations across the Middle Danube in such numbers as to delay Gratian’s relief force while
on its way to aid Valens against the Goths.11 Pannonia Valeria, the northeastern-most Pannonian
province, bounded in the north and east by half of Roman Pannonia’s segment of the Middle
Danube, was completely overrun.12 From Valeria, innumerable Sarmatians, Goths, and Huns,
pushed inland to the rest of Pannonia, though Gratian’s force was able to maintain the relative
security of Pannonia Secunda in the south.13
Gregory of Nazianzus, seeking a contemporary allusion for championing peace in a
theological tract on the subject, remarked on the affairs of the Danube frontier:
But horrible are what we both see and hear in our own day too: regions depopulated,
casualties in the thousands, an earth groaning under the weight of blood and corpses, a
race speaking a foreign tongue overrunning a country not their own as if it were their
private preserve.14
With communication and logistics disrupted along the Middle and Lower Danube, Gratian could
not, for the time being, effectively command the entire theatre as well as the rest of the Empire’s
affairs. It was for this reason that the Western Roman Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum was
divided in two, with Dacia and Macedonia being officially transferred to the governance of
Constantinopolis.15 Sometime between 387, after Maximus forced Valentinian II from Italy, and
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392, the entirety of Illyricum would fall under the administration of Theodosius.16 This division,
gradually encumbering frontier command and logistics from the late 380s onwards, would
remain an ongoing controversy in imperial politics and an internal frontier between the Eastern
and Western Roman governments for decades to come.
After the defeat of Valens and his standoff with Fritigern no longer a pressing issue for
Gratian to have to attend, the latter was free to sort out the mixed barbarian invasion of
Pannonia. Some months after the invasion of Valeria, Theodosius arrived from his abode in
Hispania to take up a command along the Danube. Before long, he would claim a number of
modest victories, particularly over the Sarmatians, and it was this scarcely documented period of
open warfare along the Danube Limes and in the Pannonian hinterlands that underscored his
candidacy for the Eastern Roman throne.17 Orosius even mentions that Gratian “invested him
with the purple at Sirmium,” the capital of the Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum and major
administrative center for the Middle Danube.18 Not long after he was appointed emperor,
Theodosius initiated a massive recruitment drive, impressing as many able-bodied men as he
could to bolster the armies, including those which had maimed themselves in the hopes of
escaping the draft.19 Before long, his new recruits—the East would remain strapped for
manpower for the foreseeable future—and capable leadership would see the conflict through. By
mid-379, after the better part of a year of border wars, the Middle Danube appeared to have
sufficiently stabilized for Gratian to leave the region in the care of his commanders and returned
to managing the affairs of the Western Roman Empire.
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After the invasions of 378 and 379 had been quelled, and after Gratian and Theodosius I,
newly appointed as emperor of the East, had departed from the Middle Danube to deal with
Fritigern, the Pannonian Limes were greatly reinforced, but they were not free from barbarian
raids. Hostilities with some peoples in the Pannonian Plain, most notably the Sarmatians,
lingered intermittently until around 383 or 384.20 By around 384 or 385, perhaps slowed by the
imposition of the Carpathian Mountains, the Huns and their subjects had settled large tracts of
the increasingly overpopulated Pannonian Plain.21 Some Hunnic and Alanic tribes continued
further west, with the Alans serving as the Hunnic Horde’s vanguard, pressuring the Germanic
nations beyond Carpathia against the Rhine and Upper Danube and creating ample living space
for the Huns as far as southern Germania.22 While documentation regarding the affairs of the
Huns beyond the Danube flatlines after 386, by the late 380s, the Huns had permeated to varying
degrees every territory bordering the Middle and Lower Danube.23 Roman Pannonia would
never fully recover from the invasions of the 370s and 380s, and the weakening of its frontiers,
compounded by the Pannonian Plain’s indefensible geography and the increasing pressures from
the populations of Huns and other peoples beyond the Middle Danube, enabled the slow
dissolution of Roman control over the Pannonian provinces from the 390s onwards.
By the early 390s, with effectively all Roman-aligned settlements beyond the Euxine
having been raised to the ground and the northern bank of the Danube bearing a mixed
population of barbarians under increasing pressure from the oncoming Huns, the Hunnic Horde
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had driven the northern bound of Roman influence squarely back to the banks of the Danube and
the southern Euxine coast.24 The decentralized power structure and inter-tribal organization of
the Hunnic Horde notwithstanding, the Huns and their subjects as a demographic unit possessed
the geopolitical initiative in the hinterlands beyond the Roman Danube frontier, but a lack of
information regarding their impact on the layout of various barbarian realms, coupled with
pressing internal affairs within the Empire, led to the Romans making no particular efforts to
alter their management of the frontier from its regular patterns of operation after 382. Ongoing
maintenance and permanent garrisons of limitanei, riverine patrols by the Classibus Flavia
Moesica and Pannonica, and land patrols along the roadways of the Danube Limes, largely
restored after the Gothic War, continued as usual, completely unprepared for the coming wars
that in less than a century’s time would prove the undoing of both the Empire and its Danube
frontier.
These brewing conflicts were, however, not to say that the Romans had absolutely no
idea that something unusual was brewing in the wild north. Undoubtedly, at the very least, as
north-south trade over the Euxine dried up between the 370s and 380s, those dwelling in the
ports and market towns ringing the southern Euxine would have had some vague perspective on
the affairs of the Pontic Steppe. Those living near to the Danube would also be aware of new
movements among the barbarians in the lands beyond the opposing shore. Echoing the writings
of his literary forerunners—for Herodotus and Strabo, the Danube would have seemed almost as
remote as the Pontic Steppe relative to the prosperous cities of the Mediterranean—Ammianus
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communicates as much himself, as in referring to the gathering of the Goths on the Danube, he
wrote:
While these events were passing in foreign countries, a terrible rumour arose that the
tribes of the north were planning new and unprecedented attacks upon us ... At first this
intelligence was lightly treated by our people, because they were not in the habit of
hearing of any wars in those remote districts ‘till they were terminated either by victory
or by treaty. But presently, as the belief in these occurrences grew stronger, being
confirmed, too, by the arrival of the foreign ambassadors...25
Clearly the news of increased activity in the north was readily available information to the
common citizen—at least to those living in or around townships capable of communicating with
the Empire at large. Why, then, were the Danube Limes not bolstered to meet the potential threat
of oncoming barbarians, either before the Roman-Gothic War or in the years immediately
thereafter?
Throughout the fourth century, the Eastern Roman emperor never admitted a force of
barbarians across the frontier on the basis of trust alone.26 Instead, the Emperor was always
present at the head of an overwhelming force of comitatenses, and had a pre-arranged network of
supply lines able to support the logistical weight of his field armies and the barbarian immigrants
during the immigration and settlement process.27 The crossing of the Goths in 376 had no such
organization, as Valens and effectively his entire field force was committed against Persia on the
other end of the Eastern Roman Empire; his distant campaign, having removed the only reserve
forces typically available to the limitanei, paved the way for the Gothic War and the frontier’s
initial collapse.28 The Goths, both as a force directly between Constantinopolis and the Danube,
and having thoroughly ravaged the farmlands of the Eastern Balkans necessary to support both
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local populations and a north-bound Roman relief force, prevented Roman high command from
reorganizing the frontier during the conflict. Only after the Goths had been contained in Moesia
Inferior and Scythia Minor, largely by Gratian’s Western Roman forces, over the course of 381
and 382 could the decrepit Lower Danube be restored and managed from Constantinopolis once
more. The reestablishment of Eastern Roman control over the Lower Danube in the early 380s
proved fortunately timely; recording the events of the winter of 381-382, Zosimus writes:
Theodosius had other fortunate successes, when he defeated the Sciri and the Carpodaces,
among whom were some Huns, and forced them to cross the Danube and return home.
This heartened the soldiers and they seemed for a short time to recover from their
previous misfortunes, while farmers were able to attend to their land, and farm animals
and their young grazed without fear.29
Having to rely on the aid of Western Roman troops to maintain the Danube frontier aside,
the critical defeats at Hadrianopolis and Salonica only compounded the Empire’s martial and
administrative difficulties. Themistius later lamented:
Although it is possible for me to go through the man's valorous exploits in the war, I
think I will leave these for the poets and historians whose task it is to celebrate and exalt
'battles and slaughterings of men.' For my part, inasmuch as I am a lover of peace and
peaceful and untroubled words, I will proceed to these things, having first brought to
mind some small matters, so that you may realize more fully the kind of circumstance
from which, and to which, through the king's foresight we have passed. For after the
indescribable Iliad of evils on the Ister [Danube] and the onset of the monstrous flame
[invasions and border warfare], when there was not yet a king set over the affairs of the
Romans [referring to the interregnum between the death of Valens and the appointment
of Theodosius I], with Thrace laid waste, with Illyria laid waste, when whole armies had
vanished completely like a shadow, when neither impassable mountains, unfordable
rivers, nor trackless wastes stood in the way, but when finally nearly the whole of the
earth and sea had united beside the barbarians, and from here and there, encircling them
on one side and another Celts, Assyrians, Libyans, and Iberians, as many as faced the
Romans.30
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After the Gothic War, Theodosius spent the rest of his reign working to rebuild the Eastern
Roman field army from the ground up.31 This herculean effort, complicated by the need to put
down two imperial usurpers in 388 and 394, both heightened the inward focus of Eastern Roman
military administration and consumed most remaining Eastern Roman manpower. In other
words, by the close of 382, the Eastern Roman military was utterly exhausted and its leadership,
while slowly learning through continual frontier warfare, remained largely ignorant of the nature
of the force bearing down on the Roman Danube. Thus, the frontier, having been repaired as
immediately necessary after the Gothic War, was left without considerable augmentation, and
was therefore vulnerable to the aggression of the Huns and their thralls. Their remarkable
prowess in conducting both maneuver and siege warfare against their sedentary Greek and
Roman counterparts had been profoundly exhibited in their westward campaigns through Gothic
Scythia and against the scattered townships along the Euxine coast and in the Pontic interior—
within years, their martial skill would see the offending steppe nomads deep into the Roman
provinces on the Danube and elsewhere.
By the early 390s, the Goths that had settled on imperial soil, particularly the Thervingi,
had rebounded from the losses incurred during the Gothic War, and had maintained their distinct
Gothic identity in the face of a pervasive, hostile Roman culture to the chagrin of the Roman
leadership that had begrudgingly officiated their continued presence.32 As part of the peace of
382, the constituent foederati arrangement, necessitated by Eastern Roman losses throughout the
recent conflict, facilitated the Goths quick accession to the Roman ranks. Amplifying the slow
Germanization of numerous Roman units, among both the limitanei and comitatenses,
Theodosius also sought to attract recruitable barbarians from along the opposing shores and
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hinterlands beyond of the Rhine and Danube—a move which the archaeological record from
Gaul to the Middle East seems to indicate was at least somewhat successful.33
By the late 380s, even a number of officer’s positions in the reconsolidating Eastern
Roman field armies had been occupied by barbarian recruits, and while some probably came
from Germanic populations from beyond the Rhine and Danube, many among them were
veterans or the sons of veterans of the recent Gothic War.34 Gothic commanders like Gainas,
Tribigild, and Alaric all possessed remarkable martial ability in the service of the Roman state,
yet the intense distrust of the barely settled barbarians in the Roman Balkans, both among the
common imperial citizenry and the Eastern government at Constantinopolis, led to their careers
never acceding to the heights they had imagined. Gainas was among the first Gothic
commanders of note in the Eastern Roman army, rising through the ranks gradually in the 380s
and early 390s under Theodosius to a limited command over a force consisting primarily of
Goths; his role in Eastern Roman politics would arise later in the 390s, but his command in the
meantime witnessed the rise of a much more impactful Gothic leader.
In the summer or autumn of 391, the Moesian Goth Alaric led a sizeable inter-tribal
confederation south across the Haemus into Thrace. Among his eclectic host appear numerous
long since extinct barbarian peoples; Claudian records Bastarnae, Getae, Alans, Huns, and
Sarmatians having joined Alaric’s march.35 While the actuality of these groups is doubtful, they
do reveal that the Goths had enrolled the assistance of various peoples from beyond the Lower
Danube.36 Theodosius I marched out to meet them with his reconstituted field army, only for
Alaric’s forces to ambush the Roman columns while on the march in the vicinity of the Maritsa
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River. The following defeat must have set Eastern Roman recruitment and morale back several
years; Theodosius retired from the war effort after having been pulled from the slaughter at
Maritsa by his faithful commander Promotus, the latter famed for having quashed Odotheus’
attempt at crossing the Danube in 386.37 For his service, Theodosius gave Promotus command
over the remains of the Eastern Roman forces to crush Alaric and his entourage, only for his to
fall in the line of duty within a year’s time.38 He was replaced by Stilicho, who whittled down
and encircled Alaric’s force over the course of 392, but instead of executing the marauder and
selling off his following into slavery throughout the provinces as was so common in such cases,
Theodosius had other things in mind.39
Alaric was let off lightly and enrolled with several contingents of Goths within the
Eastern Roman army under Gainas’ command.40 Given the losses incurred by the already
strapped regular Eastern Roman field army in attempting to put Alaric’s forces down, forcing the
Goths to fight and die in the place of Roman troops in Rome’s conflicts, so long as they could be
kept in line otherwise, seemed to best service the Empire’s present needs. Theodosius and his
government would not have to wait long to put its dubious new arrangement to the test. On
September 5-6, 394, Theodosius led his forces under Stilicho, Gainas, and Alaric against
imperial usurper Eugenius and magister militum Arbogast at the Battle of the Frigidus in the
effort of securing the Western Roman throne for his son and recently-appointed Augustus
Honorius.41 Alaric commanded Theodosius’ vanguard, comprised mainly of Goths, which
sustained a disproportionately high casualty rate due to their placement in the battleline, though,
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after the Eastern Romans proved victorious, this was not seen as a particularly grievous loss.
Orosius recounted the Roman perspective on the fallen Goths with
Thus in this case too, the fires of civil war were quenched by the blood of two men,
leaving out of account the ten thousand Goths, who, it is said, were sent ahead by
Theodosius and destroyed to a man by Arbogastes; for the loss of these was certainly a
gain and their defeat a victory.42
Between the loss of nearly the entire Gothic contingent in the battle and not receiving a
noteworthy command in the Roman army for his gallantry and the sacrifice of so many of his
countrymen, mistrust and resentment for the Roman regime on both the part of Alaric as well as
his fellow Goths only grew.43
Since the close of the Gothic War, Theodosius I’s appointment to the Eastern Roman
throne provided a stabilizing influence for the Roman Empire. His reign oversaw the dispulsion
of several threats to imperial integrity, including the repair and garrisoning of the Middle and
Lower Danube limes’ most critical regions in the 380s, the beginning of the slow process of
rebuilding the Eastern Roman army after the defeats at Hadrianopolis and Salonica, the defeat of
the usurper Magnus Maximus at the Battle of the Sava River (388), and, near the end of his
reign, the defeat of usurper Eugenius at the Battle of the Frigidus. After the lattermost victory,
Theodosius I was left indisputably as the Roman World’s sole emperor, and would enjoy a brief
few months of peaceful unitary governance, the last such period in Roman history before the Fall
of the Western Empire in 476, before his death of a severe edema on January 17, 395 in
Mediolanum.44
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His death in early 395 sent destabilizing shockwaves through the Empire. Imperial
authority was spilt between his two young sons, Arcadius and Honorius, both of whom were
inexperienced and susceptible to political subversion by ambitious Roman officers of their late
father’s regime.45 For his years of faithful service to the ailing emperor, Theodosius
“commended his children to the care of Stilicho,” and while Honorius, merely ten years old at
the time of his father’s death, acceded to the Western throne under his careful guardianship,
Arcadius would not prove so easy to maintain influence over.46 Philostorgius described the
seventeen-year-old Arcadius as:
short of stature, and weak in bodily frame; his personal strength was slight, and his
complexion dark. The sloth of his natural disposition showed itself in his speech, and in
the blinking of his eyes, which remained closed like those of persons asleep, and were
kept open with an effort.47
As Stilicho remained at a considerable distance to Arcadius’ Eastern Roman court at
Constantinopolis, the dimwitted Eastern Emperor quickly fell under the influence of Rufinus,
Praetorian Prefect of the East.48 Before long, the two halves of the Empire, divided more so by
the rivalry between Stilicho and Rufinus than any other factor, were vying for dominance.
Apart from splitting the Empire’s political consciousness in two, Theodosius’ death had
profound implications for the Empire on a strategic level. While the integrity of the frontier as a
whole had been reestablished after 382, segments of the Danube limes remained in an enervated
state as Theodosius, strapped for new recruits in the wake of the Gothic War, pressed several
frontier detachments and local garrisons into his composite field army to adequately address and
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dispatch the civil wars of 388 and 394. Such was the fate of various internal defensive networks,
most notably the defensive infrastructure—road forts, castella, and other local defensive
hardpoints—of the Julian Alps, the bulwark guarding eastern overland access to the Italian
Peninsula, as it was stripped virtually bare of manpower in the mid-380s.49 While economical in
the face of Rome’s immediate civil wars, Theodosius’ failure to redeploy men to these areas after
his victory at the Frigidus left the northwesterly route into Italia open to any enterprising hostile
force south of the Middle or Lower Danube.
As Arcadius rose to the throne in Constantinopolis, the Eastern Roman Empire had only
scattered field units and local garrisons at its immediate disposal. Most of Theodosius’ Eastern
Roman units had been with him when he died in Italia and had defaulted to Stilicho’s
command.50 Political disorder precipitating from Theodosius’ death only further compounded
the martial convalescence of the Eastern Roman Empire as recruitment and training efforts
rapidly faltered across its holdings, particularly in the Balkans; the Hunnic presence beyond the
Danube also made Roman recruitment directly from the barbaricum unfeasible.51 Sensing the
weakness of Roman defensive potential, as much of the Balkan and Anatolian regions were
unprepared to rebuff endemic rebellions and hosts from beyond the Danube and the Euxine,
The momentum of Hunnic immigration into Europe had begun to subside over the 380s
and, as both greater volumes of land fell under their dominion and the greatest hostile forces
among the native barbarous peoples were either subjected to Hunnic suzerainty or driven into the
Roman Empire, the intertribal unity that perpetuated the intertribal structure of the Hunnic Horde
steadily weakened. Between the 370s and 390s, individual Hunnic tribes dispersed over Pontic
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Steppe and Carpathia with varying degrees of intertribal cooperation, though the Roman Danube,
a more robust, albeit degraded, obstacle than the forests and mountains of Eastern Europe,
presented the oncoming Hunnic tribes with a common impasse. The Hunnic tribes venturing
westwards thereby created a pileup in the plains beyond the Middle and Lower Danube, and
within a couple generations, intertribal confederation would produce the first localized Hunnic
kingdoms.
At the same time, Theodosius’ conservative employment of his field forces after the
Gothic War and in the face of the civil wars of 388 and 394, coupled with the lack of preemptive
strikes into regions beyond vulnerable sections of the frontiers, as had been common under
Valens and his predecessors, enabled large numbers of Hunnic tribes to gather and cooperate
beyond both the Danube and Caucasus frontiers uncontested. By his death in 395, two major
Hunnic invasion forces had coalesced beyond these frontiers. The first came during the winter of
394-395, as Philostorgius records:
The Huns, who had seized upon that part of Scythia [Romanian Plain and the
southwestern Pontic Steppe] which lies across the Ister [Danube] and laid it waste,
afterwards crossed the river when it was frozen over, and made an irruption into the
Roman territory: then spreading themselves over the entire surface of Thrace, they laid
waste all Europe.52
While the existence of scattered Huns settled in and around Thrace in the first decades of the
fifth century would point to a number of these Huns having established permanent residences
within the Roman Balkans, literary sources fail to detail the fate of this invasion force.53 As the
Eastern Romans did not have the requisite forces to blunt the Hunnic offensive, the raiders likely
52
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either withdrew the way they had come of their own accord or dispersed so thoroughly into the
Balkan demographic as to no longer constitute a discernable population. A combination of both
potentials is also possible.
Later that year, in the summer of 395, another large force of Huns advanced through the
Caucasus and Roman Armenia into the borderlands between Rome and Persia:
But the Eastern Huns crossed the river Tanais, and pouring into the provinces of the East,
made an irruption through the Greater Armenia into a district called Melitine. Thence
they proceeded to attack the parts about the Euphrates, and penetrated as far as CoeleSyria, and having overrun Cilicia, destroyed an incredible number of its inhabitants.54
This force segmented into at least three distinct detachments, mutually venturing into Eastern
Anatolia, Syria, and Persia’s Mesopotamian heartlands as far as the vicinity of Ctesiphon.55
While the Hunnic raid of the eastern provinces in 395 would inflict scarce permanent damages
on the Roman or Persian landscapes of the Middle East, their presence would take the Eastern
Romans two years to forcibly dissuade from their looting campaign, distracting what few
resources Constantinopolis had at its disposal after the death of Theodosius from brewing
conflicts in the Balkans.
As the Hunnic raiders advanced over the Danube in 395, the imperial territories settled by
the Thervingi in Moesia Inferior and Scythia Minor were first to be pillaged.56 Only months
prior, Alaric’s Gothic contingent served as collateral at the Battle of the Frigidus in a Roman
civil war with little bearing on the Gothic communities along the Danube.57 Both events
demonstrated that the Goths’ fortunes and security, ostensibly under the protection of the
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Romans—both those defending the Danube limes in the immediate, and, more holistically, those
governing the Empire—could not be guaranteed so long as the nature of their existence within
the confines of the Roman world remained unchanged.58 As little remained to bind his
countrymen to their ravaged homesteads in the Upper Balkans, Alaric and the Goths under his
limited command in the Roman army, enkindled the Lower Danube Thervingi and numerous
Gothic volunteers in the Balkans, to war. Before long, Alaric found himself elevated to the
status of ‘king’ over the largest armed force in the Roman Balkans, whose collective exploits
against Rome cemented a new poly-Gothic community which, before long, was ascribed the
name ‘Visigoths’ by their Roman observers.59
Early in 395, he set out towards Constantinopolis, reaching the perimeter of the
Constantinian Walls within weeks, though his purposes in doing so are not entirely clear.60 He
may have sought, as some assert, merely to demand the proper command as magister militum he
believed his actions before and during the Battle of the Frigidus warranted, although, given the
all but undefended state of Eastern Rome, it is plausible he sought to instill new living and social
arrangements for his Gothic kinsmen within imperial affairs.61 In any case, upon reaching the
city walls a few months thereafter, in much the same fashion as Fritigern had experienced a few
decades prior, the imposing façade of Nova Roma’s Constantinian Walls turned his attention to
softer targets elsewhere in the Balkans, pillaging through southern Thrace, Macedonia, and down
the Greek Peninsula.62
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Stilicho had in the meantime mustered his combined host, comprised of some of the
Empire’s most veteran field units, and began marching long the Dinaric Alps to deal with
Alaric.63 Yet, despite having ample forces to corner Alaric’s roving force in Greece and destroy
it in pitched battle, Stilicho released the Eastern Roman units under his command to
Constantinopolis for redeployment.64 Claudian spun this event as being Stilicho’s dutiful
response to a request sent by Arcadius to yield the East its field army, though this just as well
could have been a response of his own initiative to the East’s indefensibility along the Danube as
well as his recognition of the difficulties of logistics and effective command in directing both a
large segment of the Western Roman field army and virtually the entirety of its Eastern
counterpart at the same time.65
Stilicho sent the Eastern troops, already composed in part by Germanic barbarians, along
with a considerable detachment of Gothic auxiliaries to Constantinopolis, all under the
leadership of Gainas, still an Eastern Roman field commander just as he had been under
Theodosius.66 After detaching Gainas and the Eastern Roman units, Stilicho withdrew from the
northern Balkans to his quarters in Italia for the winter, after which he spent the bulk of 396
restoring Roman control of the Germanic frontiers on the Rhine and Upper Danube neglected
during the recent civil wars and his abortive campaign into the Balkans.67 Arriving late in the
autumn of 395, Gainas was met a short distance from the capital by an imperial delegation
consisting of the young Arcadius, Rufinus, and numerous other attendants. The personal
weaknesses of Arcadius as emperor, Philostorgius explains:
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caused Rufinus to miscalculate his chance, for he thought that at the very first sight the
army would gladly choose him as emperor, and depose Arcadius. Moreover, the soldiers
having cut off Rufinus' head, inserted a stone into its mouth, and carrying it about upon a
pole they marched forth in every direction. They cut off his right hand too, and carried it
about through all the workshops of the city, adding these words, "Give something to the
insatiate one." In this way they collected together a large amount of gold, for they who
saw the head, gladly gave their gold on account of the pleasure they derived from the
spectacle. The ambition and thirst after power which marked Rufinus met with this end.68
With the Praetorian Prefect having been dispatched, Gainas assumed martial control over
Constantinopolis with his Gothic forces. Guardianship over the young emperor, however, was
seized by Eutropius, an influential Eastern Roman eunuch serving as Arcadius’ head
chamberlain and the leader of a faction opposed to the governance of the late Rufinus.69 The
relationship between Gainas and the emperor’s new regent was quickly strained by their mutual
ambitions, and as Gainas received little recognition from his role in bringing Eutropius to power,
his dissatisfaction with the sitting Eastern Roman regime only grew.70
Meanwhile, Alaric ravaged Greece as far south as the Peloponnese.71 While
Constantinopolis was embroiled in repulsing the Huns terrorizing the eastern provinces, Stilicho,
having satisfactorily reasserted Roman control over the Rhine and Upper Danube, launched a
new offensive against Alaric in the spring of 397.72 Having made landfall in Thessaly, Stilicho
bottled the marauding Goth and his forces into the mountains of Epirus and southern Illyricum
with only light fighting, causing an anxious stir among the government offices at
Constantinopolis.73 Eutropius, more threatened by Stilicho than the Goths, convinced Arcadius
to proclaim Alaric as magister militum of Illyricum, giving him the requisite civil and military
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authority to requisition food and supplies from the various townships in the Western Balkans for
sustaining his countrymen.74 Having been politically outflanked, Stilicho embarked his landing
force once again and returned to Italia only to find that, in an effort to ostracize him from Eastern
Roman affairs going forward, Eutropius had implored Arcadius to declare Stilicho a hostis
publicus, thereby depriving him of the same logistical support to which Alaric had recently been
granted access.75 This arrangement quelled Alaric’s pillaging for the next few years, but by no
means offered a solution to the potential for chaos his people represented to both the Eastern and
Western Roman Empires.
As he continued to consolidate his control over Eastern Roman affairs, Eutropius
gathered what Eastern Roman units he could, many among them having come from Stilicho’s
command, and launched a counteroffensive in 398 against a second major Hunnic raid into the
Eastern provinces, successfully repulsing them in Roman Armenia and returning to the capital in
triumph.76 With a victory over the Huns behind him, Eutropius convinced the Eastern Emperor
to appoint him as consul in 399 to the Eastern Roman Senate; such a move was unprecedented,
given that he was both a eunuch and a former slave, and instigated a sea of intrigue in
Constantinopolis and a political crisis throughout the Eastern Roman Empire.77 Eunapius wrote
of the situation:
The eunuch held power in the palace and, coiling around through the halls, like a true
serpent seized everything and dragged it off to his lair. Eutropius made endless and eager
use of his opportunities and good fortune and he immersed himself so much in his
meddling that if a father hated his son, a husband his wife, a mother her daughter, none
escaped his notice.78
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In Phrygia, many of the Greuthungi which had been resettled there during the 380s and
390s, took advantage of the political disorder and rose in revolt under a Gothic comes named
Tribigild, pillaging the Anatolian interior and demanding the deposition of Eutropius.79 Arcadius
dispatched a sizable host under magister militum Leo, noted as “a placid man and easily led
because of addiction to drink,” only for it to be defeated with months of its departure from
Constantinopolis.80 Sensing an opportunity to undermine his rival after Leo’s defeat, Gainas met
with Arcadius and convinced him of the Anatolian Greuthungi’s invincibility, advising him to
accede to their demands.81 Within days, Eutropius’ power base collapsed beneath him as his
assets were seized, edicts repealed, and influential seat in the palace replaced with a grim
banishment to the island of Cyprus.82
In the meantime, Gainas, recently appointed as Leo’s replacement for the East’s magister
militum, amassed a second army to engage with Tribigild’s forces, yet after having marched into
Anatolia, he elected to finally brake with Roman authority and joined the rouge Greuthungi
forces.83 While Tribigild would by some means perish along the way to Constantinopolis,
Gainas led the combined force of Goths across the Hellespont to collectively occupy
Constantinopolis in early 400. His rule, markedly unsuccessful due to both his own tyrannical
incompetence as governor—while in control of the Roman court, he would even have the
disgraced Eutropius put to death—and the mass resentment of the predominantly-Christian,
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Graeco-Roman Constantinopolitans of their predominantly-Arrian, barbarian occupiers, lasted
several months, but by the summer of 400, the social and political tension behind the
Constantinian Walls had reached a boiling point. In July, while Gainas and much of his Gothic
force was beyond the walls in the Thracian countryside, the citizenry of Constantinopolis took up
arms, barred the gates, and slew 7,000 Goths trapped within the city’s confines, constituting
perhaps one fifth of the Gothic host.84 In the wake of this sudden, costly rebellion, Gainas took
what remained of his barbarian host and attempted to cross the Hellespont back into Anatolia.
At was at this critical moment that Fravitta, a Gothic general in Roman service, having been
indisposed suppressing “brigands” in Cilicia and the Levant since 395, as Eunapius wrote, “so
that brigandage almost disappeared from the lips of men,” returned to the vicinity of
Constantinopolis.85 His host annihilated the Goths at sea as they attempted to cross to Anatolia,
trouncing the final major Gothic force east of Illyricum and returning to Arcadius’ court to
receive an appointment as consul in 401.86
In the wake of the Gothic defeat, Gainas took what little remained of his forces and
retreated northwards through the Balkans, crossing the Danube, and attempted to settle just north
of the Lower Danube “in his native land.”87 By the early 400s, the Huns had taken thorough
possession of the lands beyond the Danube frontier, and while the Hunnic Horde had effectively
dissolved by the beginning of the fifth century, local Hunnic tribes throughout the territories it
had conquered had begun to produce small semi-nomadic kingdoms of their own, particularly
along the Danube frontier. Not long after their arrival in the Romanian Plain in the autumn of
400, a Hunnic king named Uldin, having taken note of the newcomers’ activities, amassed a host
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of Hunnic warriors and, through a series of bloody pitched battles, wore down Gainas’ numbers
and finally slew him on the field in the vicinity of the Roman castrum Novae.88 The existence of
an independent Gothic settlement on the periphery of Hunnic territory posed a serious threat to
Uldin and his countrymen as it presented a rallying point for the Goths living under Hunnic
dominance, and, if left unopposed, could in time serve as a major point of Germanic resistance to
the Huns.89 Worse still, as Gainas had remained near to the Roman border, despite his history
with the Eastern Roman court, his presence could potentially have been used as a tool to extend
Roman influence beyond the Danube once more. After his short campaign, Uldin fixed the head
of the former magister militum on a pole and sent it to Constantinopolis as a diplomatic gift,
receiving in turn a peace agreement with the Eastern Romans.90 While such an exchange
portended good relations between the Empire and its Hunnic counterparts along the Danube
frontier, Uldin would engage in a range of operations to the benefit and detriment of both halves
of the Roman Empire over the coming decade.
In the meantime, between the summer and autumn of 401, Alaric mustered his forces and
proceeded to advance against Italia. His reasons for this move are not specified by primary
sources, but any combination of various factors could have driven him to take up arms against
the domain of Stilicho. With the fall of Eutropius in 399, the official sanctioning of his role as
magister militum of Illyricum dropped out from under him; the loss of official logistical support
for his Gothic forces from Roman settlements in the region, coupled with the comparatively
sparce agricultural facilities present amidst the Dinaric Alps, would have put a serious supply
constraint on the Visigoths. Venturing into the fertile plains of northern Italia could certainly
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alleviate this difficulty. Alternatively, their reasoning could just as easily have been the desire
“to seek out a kingdom by their own exertions rather than serve others in idleness” as Jordanes
later describes.91 Such a motive had precedent among the Goths which settled south of the
Danube in 382; Fritigern made overtures at being recognized as the overall leader of the Goths
within Roman territory multiple times during the Gothic War, and while his death prior to 382,
compounded by Roman efforts to keep the Thervingi divided, may have made such a reality
impossible in the immediate, the idea of a Gothic kingdom not unlike that of Ermanric gained a
new lease on life in the reign of Alaric, even if he was for the time being merely the king of an
army.
Having remained relatively stationary in Illyricum, situated on the overland route of
communication between East and West, Alaric and his Visigoths could have been well informed
as to the strategic position of the Empire and the frailty of its frontiers, exhibited along the Rhine
in Stilicho’s frequent combat tours against the tribes of Germania, and along the Danube in
Gainas’ apparent ability to cross the river with a modest entourage of Goths. He could have just
as easily known about the sparce defenses throughout the Julian Alps, still all but unmanned
since Theodosius I stripped Italia’s foremost northeastern defenses in the mid-380s.92 Whatever
his reasoning, Alaric breached the perimeter of Italia between the autumn of 401 and the spring
of 402, threatening the historic heartlands of the entire Roman World.
This development was far from a welcome one for Stilicho. The Upper Danube in the
latter months of 401 was already unstable enough, as a combined force of Vandals and Alans,
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their westward migration at the forefront of the Huns having stalled at the southeastern perimeter
of Germania, were assaulting the Rhaetian and Norican segments of the Upper Danube.93 As
Stilicho had deployed all available forces on the peninsula to the Upper Danube to face these
threats, Honorius’ court, situated at Mediolanum on the western face of northern Italia, was
vulnerable to Alaric’s host; while the emperor had planned to evacuate the city for a temporary
residence in Gaul, Stilicho persuaded him to remain in place.94
Stilicho immediately began to bolster his field forces with numbers from the nearby
Gallic legions and barbarian mercenaries from beyond the frontier.95 During this brief period in
the closing months of 401, along with detachments from the Gallic legions, Stilicho enticed
several thousand Alans and Vandals and various detachments from the Danube Limes into his
composite field army.96 While his recruitment from his former enemies had alleviated some
pressure on the Danube, his recruitment from the defensive forces along the frontiers with
Germania would have problematic implications for handling Alaric a year later. Between
January and March of 402, Stilicho traversed the Alps, forced and crossing of the Adda, and
moved to intercept the Gothic host before they could reach Honorius and his court, hoping the
threat of retaliation would be sufficient to hold the increasingly tempestuous peoples of
Germania at bay.97
Alaric, having learned of Stilicho’s approach, proceeded southwest away from the
capital. Within days they came upon the township of Hasta, only for Stilicho to arrive with his
army before extensive Gothic siege operations could get underway, driving them further
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southwards into increasingly unknown territories. The Goths set camp near Pollentia wherein
Alaric chose to begin preparations for a pitched battle.98 Yet, while the predominantly Arian
Goths celebrated the festivities of Easter on Sunday, April 6, 402, the Roman army befell their
unsuspecting numbers.99 The battle proved a modest yet important victory for Stilicho, and saw
the capture of numerous Gothic prisoners of war, including Alaric’s own family, and a great deal
of loot the Goths had plundered over the previous several years.100 In the wake of the battle, as
the majority of his cavalry had reportedly survived the engagement, Alaric and his forces fled
and encamped on a nearby mountain after which talks began.
Stilicho probably offered the Visigoths a typical Foedus arrangement, including
subsidies, a command within the Western Roman military, and the return his prisoners if Alaric
swiftly departed the Italian peninsula.101 After some deliberations, Alaric and his men agreed
and moved northeastwards from whence they came, all the while a suspicious Stilicho kept tabs
on the barbarians’ movements. His concern soon proved well-founded; having discontentedly
remained on the Italian border through the remainder of 402, Alaric began to plan a new
offensive into the West, targeting the Gallic provinces by way of the mountain passes north of
Verona.102 If the Goths could traverse the Alps into the already weakly-held frontier provinces
of Rhaetia and Germania Superior, the consequences for both the Upper Danube and Rhine
frontiers could be severe. Not unlike when Fritigern bid a modern band of Huns and Alans to
join him during the Gothic War whilst enclosed between the Haemus and the Lower Danube,
Alaric, having approached the Upper Danube defenses from the rear, could have easily
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perforated the Limes and beckoned untold numbers of his Germanic cousins into the Roman
West.
Recognizing the threat, both immediate and, potentially, existential, to the Western
Roman Empire, Stilicho sent an advance force ahead to occupy the mountain passes from the
north while the main body of his army slowly corralled the Goths into the ambuscade they had
lain. By June of 402, the Goths were entrapped in the mountains not far from Verona,
completely cut off from the plunderable farmlands of northern Italia.103 With no other option,
Alaric turned to give battle, losing in the process the vast majority of his once vaunted host.104 In
the aftermath, despite being utterly at the mercy of Stilicho’s combined army, the Western
Roman magister militum merely reiterated the terms of their previous agreement, after which
Alaric and the tattered remains of the Visigoths departed Italy.
By autumn of 403, the would-be Gothic king had encamped in one of the Pannonian
provinces. His presence there introduced yet another uncontrollable variable into a rapidly
destabilizing region of the Danube frontier; while in the years since 395 the Upper Danube was
managing to hold the lines against the barbaricum, albeit with considerable micromanagement
under Stilicho, the Middle Danube was slowly weakening. By 392 at the latest, Pannonia was
transferred to Eastern Roman command as part of the Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum,
rendering it the most distant, and arguably most exposed, of all Eastern Roman segments of the
Danube frontier commanded from Constantinopolis.105 Given the distance and geographical
obstacles between the Pannonian Limes and the agricultural centers of the southern Balkans, the
material upkeep of the area’s limitanei must have been extraordinarily taxing. The Huns
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migration onto the Pannonian Plain, compounded by the instability of Roman Pannonia’s
partially-Romanized populace of Goths, Vandals, Sarmatians, and others, applied extreme
external pressure on the already exasperated defenders. “During the early years of Honorius,”
Bury writes, “the Pannonian frontier was almost abandoned,” and while Roman Pannonia alone
would be returned by the East to Honorius’ governance around late 399 or early 400, solidifying
the political boundary between the East and West going forward, the years of neglect and
atrophy from the 380s onwards enabled much greater threats to endanger the most remote
segment of the Danube frontier.106 The presence of Alaric and his unassimilated Visigoths
furthermore offered the inhabitants of Roman Pannonia a de-Romanizing alternative to life as
imperial citizens—should the thinning Roman frontier separating the barbaricum from Roman
Pannonia collapse, it could quickly lead to a permanent loss of the region for the Empire.107
Two years after Alaric’s arrival in Pannonia, a new threat emerged from the Pannonian
Plain beyond the Danube. Led by a Gothic king named Radagaisus, a large band of Goths,
Suevi, Vandals, and Alans broke through the weakening Middle Danube Limes in the closing
months of 405 and proceeded towards Italy, sacking vulnerable cities as they went.108 Unlike
many Goths who by this point had adopted Arianism, Orosius described Radagaisus as, “by far
the most savage of all our enemies ... who, according to the custom of the barbarous tribes, had
vowed the blood of the entire Roman race as an offering to his gods.”109 For the first six months
of 406, Radagaisus and his forces held sway in northern Italy. In the meantime, Stilicho again
set about organizing a new force to face the offending Goths. He managed to recruit around
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fifteen thousand from the frontiers beyond the Alps, virtually liquidating the Rhine Limes of their
garrisons, and enlisted the aid of several thousand Huns and Alans.110 The Huns in his service
originated very likely from the westernmost quarter of Uldin’s Hunnic kingdom.111 With this
force in hand, the Romans marched south to intercept the Gothic king.
By the early summer of 406, Radagaisus and his followers had advanced southwards on
their way towards Rome as far as Florentia and elected to put the latter to siege; nevertheless, the
loss of as much as one third of his fighting force in doing so demonstrated that the Goths had still
not mastered the practice of taking fortified strongholds.112 Stilicho and his forces arrived on the
scene not long thereafter, easily dispatching a large portion of the Goths’ number and putting the
rest to flight. What remained of their force encamped a few miles away, after which Radagaisus
abandoned his people and attempted to flee only to be captured and executed on August 23.113
Stilicho then proceeded to divide up his people. Desperate for new troops, both to hold the
frontiers and reconstitute the core of his field army, he pressed 12,000 of the best Gothic warriors
into his ranks.114 The rest, along with the bulk of the non-combatant populace were then sold off
to the Roman slave markets—in fact, so many were sold as slaves that under the glut of people
the Roman slave market briefly collapsed, as Orosius writes, “The Gothic captives are said to
have been so numerous that droves of them were sold everywhere like the cheapest cattle for an
aureus apiece.”115
In the wake of Radagaisus’ defeat, the slave market was not the only thing to implode.
As Stilicho had stripped the Rhine of most of its manpower, in the summer and autumn of 406,
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numerous peoples from Germania and beyond migrated steadily towards the Rhine.116 Living on
the opposing side of the river, the Franks offered staunch resistance to the oncoming Goths,
Vandals, Alans, and others, but were overcome by their opposition’s sheer numbers. On
December 31, as the Rhine had frozen over in the harsh winter, the Rhine Limes and Northern
Gaul were swiftly overrun by a human wave, the momentum of which Stilicho could not hope to
arrest with his meager forces.117 In the wake of the Rhine crossing, as Britannia feared the
potential of the barbarians crossing the English Channel, the island revolted under an imperial
pretender by the name of Marcus in 406.118 This first pretender, after reigning for less than a
year, was deposed and replaced with Gratian who reigned until 407.119 His successor, a soldier
entitled Constantine III, later spread the Britannic rebellion into Gaul wherein he won the
loyalties of the Gallic legions and achieved some success in stemming the tide against the people
flooding over the Rhine; as Honorius was unable to dispel this revolt, Constantine was simply
affirmed as co-emperor in the West in 409.120 The Rhine crossing, losses of control over
Britannia and Gaul, and other internal political and military failures precipitated the deposition
and execution of Stilicho in August of 408. The death of the Western Roman Empire’s foremost
general enabled the Alaric—whose numbers were greatly reinforced after the Goths Stilicho had
enrolled in his army from the host of Radagaisus fled to him following Stilicho’s execution—to
inflict a terrible vengeance upon the dominion of Honorius less than two years later in the Sack
of Rome.
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In the meantime, Uldin and his Huns were proving themselves a threat to the integrity of
the Lower Danube frontier. Some months before the intrusion of Radagaisus and his people into
Pannonia, in late 404 or early 405, Uldin led a sizable force of Huns across the Lower Danube to
raid the Roman Balkans as far as Thrace.121 The fine details of this invasion—numbers of
combatants, routes of travel, and dates—are not known, as Sozomen, the only writer of the time
to make note of it, does so only in passing.122 A few years thereafter, in the summer of 408, he
initiated a second major offensive over the Danube. This invasion was well timed; as Alaric’s
Goths were migrating back to Italy in the wake of Stilicho’s fall and many of the troops stationed
along the Lower Danube Limes had been pulled from their posts and sent eastwards to the
Persian frontier in anticipation of renewed hostilities with the Empire’s eastern neighbor.123 By
treachery, Uldin and his forces seized control of Castra Martis, a castrum situated twenty miles
southwest of the riverfront castrum Bononia along the road from Bononia to Naissus.124
While situated there, he proceeded to plunder the surrounding countryside. Sozomen
notes, “the prefect of the Thracian cohorts made propositions of peace to him, but he [Uldin]
replied by pointing to the sun and declaring that it would be easy to him to him, if he desired to
do so, to subjugate every region of the Earth that is enlightened by that luminary.”125 He
demanded heavy tribute from Constantinopolis in exchange for his withdrawal.126 While he
certainly boasted leadership of a strong unitary polity beyond the Danube and held a fortified
position within Roman territory, his position was far from secure. While the Roman commander
engaged him in pursuit of peace, secret negotiations were also carried out between the Romans
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and Uldin’s officers; they were told of the emperor’s humanitarian benevolence and rewards he
offered to brave soldiers in his ranks.127
Before long, the bulk of Uldin’s host deserted him for the Roman camp, after which only
through sanguinary difficulty were he and a handful of his loyalists able to battle their way back
to and across the Danube.128 While Uldin quickly fades from the historical record after his
withdrawal from the Roman Balkans, peace between his purportedly mighty Hunnic kingdom
and the Eastern Roman Empire was not yet a certainty, as neither Sozomen nor any other
contemporary writer make any reference of when the conflict drew to a close.129 However,
evidence for a peace of sorts—however formal or informal is indeterminable—forged in the
spring of 409, along with a series of building campaigns set on repairing the Eastern Empire’s
strategic and defensive infrastructure, may be found in the decrees of the Eastern Roman court
and those controlling it.
After the death of Arcadius’ wife Eudoxia in October of 404, who had battled
Constantinopolitan Archbishop John Chrysostom for the role of the impressionable Eastern
emperor’s foremost influencer after the death of Gainas, an experienced Praetorian Prefect by the
name of Anthemius arose to manage the emperor and his government’s affairs.130 Having
steadily arisen through the ranks of the Eastern Roman bureaucracy, the veteran administrator
was elected the Eastern consul in 405, after which he was elevated to his enduring role as
Praetorian Prefect of the East. Arcadius “slumbered” on his throne for the final three and a half
years of his reign, dying on May 1, 408.131 However, unlike when he and Honorius had
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ascended to the throne after the death of Theodosius I, the transition of power to his seven-yearold son Theodosius II went uninterrupted by the all-too familiar Roman tradition of succession
crises, as appointed the young sovereign as co-emperor back in 402.132
Serving as the young ruler’s regent, Anthemius set about reestablishing Eastern Roman
authority along the Empire’s frontiers. In 408, he reaffirmed the Empire’s non-aggression pact
with Yazdegerd I of Persia that he had assisted in negotiating eight years earlier; once any doubts
regarding security of the Empire’s eastern frontier had been set aside, the praetorian prefect was
free to turn his attention towards the Empire’s less stable northern periphery.133 On March 23,
409, in the wake of Uldin’s failed invasion, the Eastern government passed a law provisioning
for the division and dispersal of barbarian loot seized by the military; this included persons
bound for slavery, as many of the thousands who had defected to the Romans were destined to be
dispensed with via the markets.134 Many among them were Germanic Sciri, who were
“conveyed in chains to Constantinopolis.”135 The authorities therein feared the prospect of a
popular revolt if they should be permitted to live as a single population, as had been the case
with the Thervingi settled along the Danube, and mandated that they should be distributed
“throughout the transmarine provinces” to those desiring to take them on as slave labor, thereby
facilitating their assimilation into the imperial populace.136
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Once Stilicho had fallen from power in the West, Alaric had marched westwards from
Illyricum, and the Huns along the Lower and Middle Danube had been temporarily humbled,
Anthemius began a radical reconstruction and reorganization campaign along the increasingly
fragile frontier. The territories around the Danube Limes, especially the castra, and their
possessors were of especial importance to Anthemius and his advisors, as a measure passed on
April 29, 409, stipulated:
Whereas we have learned that the tracts of land which had been granted by a benevolent
provision of the ancients to the barbarians for the care and protection of the border and of
the border fortifications are being held by some other persons, if such persons are holding
these lands because of their cupidity or desire, they shall know that they must serve with
zeal and labor in the care of the border fortifications and in the protection of the border,
just as did those persons whom antiquity assigned to this task. Otherwise, they shall
know that these tracts of land must be transferred either to the barbarians of they can be
found, or certainly to veterans, not undeservedly, so that by the observance of this
provision there may be no suggestion of fear in any portion of the border fortification and
the border.137
Clearly Anthemius recognized the danger of resettling barbarians within imperial territory as
homogenous populations as had been done in 382, and while this measure clearly casts
preference for Roman veterans to hold frontier territories, he does at least—possibly wishing to
avoid sowing the seeds of dissention among them—give the partially- and non-Romanized
barbarians still dwelling in Scythia Minor, Moesia, and Pannonia the sanctioned opportunity to
help hold the line.
These defensive measures continued beyond the Limes’ static infrastructure and their
surroundings. Stilicho in his final months had established garrisons along busy points of entry
into the Western Roman Empire, particularly major highways, harbors and trade ports, and
coasts suitable for landing ships, in an effort to preclude the growth of Eastern Roman power

137

Codex Theodosianus 7.15.1.

91

beyond Illyricum.138 After his death the Eastern Roman government would decry and demand
the removal of this “unaccustomed practice,” highlighting its detrimental effect upon travel and
economic ties between the East and West, they would enact the exact same measure in the East
in April of 410.139 Nearly two years later, in January of 412, the Classis Flavia Moesica
received a seven-year shipbuilding program, as Anthemius ordered the restoration of all aging
vessels and the construction of a minimum of 225 new riverine ships for the purposes of
reinforcing surveillance patrols and the efficient transport of men and materiel along the river as
needed.140
However, what was undoubtedly Anthemius’ most abiding contribution to the Eastern
Roman Empire’s defense lay well south of the Danube. As the Constantinopolitan population
grew and its urban layout sprawled well beyond the confines of the original Constantinian Walls
it had received as part of Constantine’s rededication of the city as Nova Roma, its continued
defense required a grossly expanded defense system.141 Demarcating its bounds a mile west of
the existing defenses, Anthemius oversaw the construction of the great Theodosian Walls, so
named for the young Eastern emperor; these extraordinary defenses, complete with ninety-six
towers standing over sixty feet in height represented the most formidable battlements of the late
Roman World, attested by the Eastern Roman Empire’s survival at Constantinopolis for the next
millennium.142 As desperately needed and impressive as Anthemius’ administration and
defensive reorganization were, they represented the last period of Roman supremacy along the
Danube frontier. After 414, the uniquely capable praetorian prefect vanished from the historical
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narrative, leaving the fifteen-year-old Theodosius II and his ministers to maintain the
strengthened Eastern Roman realm.
The period in which he reached majority and began to reign with full imperial authority
was far from typical for the Empire and its frontiers. While much of the Eastern Roman Empire
was politically and economically stable, the West was in a state of disarray. In 410, Roman
control of Britannia began to rapidly dissolve as imperial forces had been steadily withdrawn
from the island to help combat internal disorder, such as was created by the barbarian migrations
over the Rhine.143 In the same year, Alaric sacked Rome itself, sending shockwaves through the
Roman World, only to die of disease in southern Italy a few months later.144 He was buried in a
secret location in the bed of the Busento River, after which he was succeeded by Athaulf, who
proceeded to lead the Visigoths westwards into southern Gaul.145 Honorius, unable to repulse
them from so deep in Roman territory and so far the crumbling frontiers, settled them as
foederati in the southern Gallic regions of Aquitania and Occitania where their ties to the land
would deepen over the proceeding decades.146
The Danube frontier was another matter. In the words of Maenchen-Helfen, “no period
in the political history of the Huns is darker than the 410s and 420s.”147 A similar lack of
specifics on the other barbarian peoples beyond the Danube and their relationship to the various
authorities throughout the domain of the Hunnic tribes leaves the state of riverine border and the
fortified settlements along it without much historical context or contrast. Scant references to the
barbaricum do, however, hint at murmurs and subtle movements in the lands of the Huns; a
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fragment of Olympiodorus’ History, for example, depicts a Western Roman embassy sent
between late 412 and early 413 to the court of a Hunnic king named Charaton somewhere in the
Pannonian Plain.148 While their realms certainly could have overlapped, the relation of Charaton
to Uldin, if there was in fact one to begin with, is unknown and very likely indeterminable, as is
the potential for any relation between the Hunnic tribes that comprised the populations of their
respective subjects.
Their distinct governances along the Roman Danube frontier nevertheless represent an
emerging pattern in Hunnic organization. From the disintegration of the Hunnic Horde to the
early 410s, the disparate Hunnic tribes operated without continual inter-tribal unity, and their
attacks on the Roman frontiers, while considerable, were of a manageable size for the
Romans.149 Yet, by the early 430s, Hunnic chieftains in the Romanian and Pannonian Plains
began to bend the knee to a singular monarchical authority and could boast an incipient empirestate of their own whose weight of arms and geo-political gravity would soon rival that of the
stricken Roman Empire.
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Chapter 3: Collapse of the Danube Frontier, A.D. 420—A.D. 447
...And, with that word, an universal blast
From thousand instruments of warlike breath
Gave note of stem defiance, and rang forth
Of stirring music a sonorous peal
From gong and cymbal, many a clashing sword
Resounding to the buckler's iron orb;
And, midst that clang, the multitudinous shout
Of all those uncouth nations, that, erewhile
Downcast and mute, by those bold words aroused
Breathed new confliction, and by hate assured
Trampled e'en now, beneath the hoofs of war,
Byzantium and the stately halls of Rome...—William Herbert

W

riting in the early sixth century, Marcellinus Comes, while noting the major events of
422, tersely scribed in his Chronicle, “The Huns devastated Thrace.”1 No mention of

the purpose, duration, or major engagements—if there were any—were listed, nor do any other
primary sources of the time make any direct mention of this nebulous Hunnic campaign at all.2
Such is the nature of the Danube’s history in 420s and early 430s, though this far from alludes to
a relative lull in the activity of the frontier. During such years, the Hunnic tribes, having
thoroughly dispatched the sovereignty of the mighty Gothic, Carpo-Dacian, Sarmatian, and
otherwise barbarous realms, gradually reconvened the bygone unity of their defunct migratory
horde, having butted up and partially settled against the Roman Danube frontier, as the Hunnic
Empire. From the mid-430s onwards to the death of the infamous Attila the Hun in 453, after
which the Huns’ incipient Empire rapidly dissolved, the northern frontier withered under
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continual contestation to point of destruction. Only in the last cataclysmic years of the ‘scourge
of God’ did Rome’s greatest and most inherently unstable frontier finally implode.
While the Hunnic invasion of 422 marks the beginning of the steady, marching decline of
the Danube frontier over its last decades, the slow crumbling of its lofty ramparts, while caused
by the barbarians from across the waters, received an important instigation from the affairs of the
east. Prior to the 420s, the Roman Empire and Sassanid Persia had successfully maintained the
peace agreement they had signed in late 386—an amended redraft of the peace hurriedly
negotiated in 377 as Valens scrambled to remove his forces from the Persian frontier to the west
in the aforementioned effort to dispatch Fritigern’s Goths.3 Nevertheless, renewed statesponsored persecution of Christians in Persia, one of the first since the reign of Constantine the
Great and the officiation of Christianity in Rome nearly a century prior, among other civil and
mercantile disputes, warranted an official Roman response, as Socrates writes:
Isdigerdes [Yazdegerd I], king of the Persians, who had always favoured the Christians in
his dominions, having died, was succeeded by Vararanes [Bahram V] his son. This
prince, at the instigation of the magi [Zoroastrian clerics], persecuted the Christians there
with so much rigour, by inflicting on them a variety of punishments and tortures, that
they were obliged to desert their country and seek refuge among the Romans, whom they
entreated not to suffer them to be completely extirpated. … The bad feeling which these
things produced, was greatly increased by the flight of the Persian Christians into the
Roman territories. For the Persian king immediately sent an embassy to demand the
fugitives, whom the Romans were by no means disposed to deliver up; not only as
desirous of defending their suppliants, but also because they were ready to do anything
for the sake of the Christian religion.4
As noted by Edward Gibbon, “The gentle mind of Theodosius was never inflamed by the
ambition of conquest or military renown; and the slight alarm of a Persian war scarcely
interrupted the tranquility of the East. The Motives of the war were just and honorable.”5
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Doubtless the Romans perceived the prospect of a new war with their Eastern neighbor
and historic rival to be nothing less than wholly justified, perhaps even welcome, as Theodosius
II declared war on Persia—insofar as Socrates seems to describe—immediately following the
address of Bahram V’s delegation.6 Hostilities had after all been potentially brewing between
the two powers since as early as May of 420.7 However, the sudden declaration of war,
seemingly justified, failed to take into account the situation beyond the Danube or the Hunnic
threat that had developed in the stated regions.
Since the dissipation of the Hunnic Horde, the Hunnic tribes had gradually agglomerated
into regional confederacies, of which the realms of Uldin and Charaton were early recorded
examples in contemporary Roman histories. The relationships between their two personages and
multi-tribal petty kingdoms, as well as any potential ties between them and later Hunnic leaders
(such as Ruga, Octar, Mundzuk, Bleda, and Attila,) cannot be ascertained with certainty.8
However, what is clear from Roman sources is that between the 380s and the 410s the Lower
Danube and the Middle Danube—the latter more so than the former—separated from one
another by the imposition of the Western Romanian and Serbian sectors of the Carpathian
Mountains, constituted the two most frequently and ferociously contested segments of the
Roman Danube. It was along these two regions of the frontier that the main bases of Hunnic
power developed, insofar as it was relevant to the affairs of Roman government officials,
military officers, and historians. After the death of Uldin, amidst the lack of any definitive
successor to his reign along the Lower Danube, the open plains, gentle hills, and scattered forests
of the eastern Pannonian Plain became the dominant center of Hunnic power to the continual
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detriment of adjacent Roman Pannonia, especially Pannonia Valeria. For succeeding Hunnic
rulers, from the rise of Ruga to the death of Attila, the same appears to have remained true;
Priscus states plainly that his diplomatic mission from Constantinopolis to Attila’s court in 448
or 449 took them past Naissus, located in Moesia Superior directly between Thrace and Pannonia
and along the Via Militaris directly connecting the two, and beyond the Danube.9
The Pannonian Plain serving as the Hunnic metropole from the 420s onwards fits the
Huns’ geopolitical stance. Since their migration into the Pannonian and Romanian Plains and
subsequent collision with the Danube Limes, the Roman Empire, by far the most powerful and
wealthy polity on the continent, became the dominant focus of their attention. Within decades of
their arrival on the periphery of Roman influence, the Huns—or at least Hunnic leadership—
must have come to realize that the authority of the Roman Empire existed between two imperial
courts in two imperial capitals; establishing the center of Hunnic power on the Pannonian Plain,
a geographic mid-point between Rome, Mediolanum, and Ravenna in the West and
Constantinopolis in the East, with direct routes of travel to either along the Roman road network,
enabled Hunnic leadership to interact with or manipulate the affairs of either half of the Empire
in parallel. In time, they would exploit this geographic advantage to the fullest.
Hostilities between Persia and the Eastern Romans began along the Eastern Frontier
sometime in early 421 and concluded approximately one year later in status quo ante bellum; as
Gibbon wrote, “a truce of one hundred years was solemnly ratified, and although the revolutions
in Armenia might threaten the public tranquility, the essential conditions of this treaty were
respected near fourscore years by the successors of Constantine and Artaxerxes.”10 Given the
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ongoing hostilities with Persia, Marcellinus Comes’ laconic recounting of the devastation so
wrought by the Huns upon Thrace is less surprising; the Goths’ petition to enter the Empire and
their subsequent pillaging campaigns, albeit brought on in part by carelessness on the part of
Roman officials in Thrace, occurred under very similar conditions. During another brief period
of Roman-Persian antagonism in 386 which ultimately produced the ratification of the peace of
377, while ultimately bloodless, was when Odotheus attempted to force a crossing of the Danube
with his following of Greuthungi.11
As Eastern Roman manpower and military resources were stretched across its frontiers,
particularly the Danube, the government at Constantinopolis likely had to defer forces from the
riverine frontier to the East, weakening the limes.12 Sassanid Persia was, after all, just coming off
of its first golden age and was internally enjoying one of its most stable and prosperous periods,
thanks in large part to the extraordinarily lengthy and successful reign of Shapur II and the
lengthy, virtually unbroken peace with Rome after 377; the fact that the limited Eastern Roman
forces under the command of Romano-Alanic general Ardabur were able to achieve numerous
modest victories, as Socrates recounts in embellished detail, is no mean feat.13
The fact that the war with Persia overlapped with the winter of 421-422 is also
significant, as this season, by virtue of historic precedent for barbarian invasions—particularly
by mounted forces—to invade when the frontier was at its weakest and the Danube’s ill tendency
to freeze over in the winter, likely afforded the Huns their best opportunity to cross into the
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northern Balkans and proceed towards Thrace.14 In light of this potential, a law passed on March
3, 422 must be considered:
Our loyal soldiers returning from combat service or setting out for war shall take for
themselves the ground floor rooms of each tower of the New Wall [Theodosian Wall] of
this sacred City [Constantinopolis]. Landholders shall not be offended on the ground that
the order which had been issued about public buildings has been violated. For even
private homes customarily furnish one third of their space for this purpose.15
Nine years prior, on April 4, 413, the Eastern Roman government under the leadership of
Praetorian Prefect Anthemius requisitioned the holdings of local landowners to lay the
foundations of the Theodosian Walls:
We command that the towers of the New Wall, which has been constructed for the
fortification of this most splendid City, shall, after the completion of the work, be
assigned to the use of the persons through whose lands this wall was duly erected by the
zeal and foresight of Your Magnitude, pursuant to the decision of our Serenity. This
regulation and condition shall be observed in perpetuity, so that said landholders and
those persons to whom the title to these lands may pass shall know that each year they
must provide for the repair of the towers at their own expense, that they shall acquire the
use of these towers as a special favor from the public, and they shall not doubt that the
care of repair and the responcibility therefore belongs to them. Thus the splendor of the
work and the fortifications of the City shall be preserved, as well as the use of such
fortifications to the advantage of private citizens.16
When one considers how grievous the social and fiscal responsibility of having to quarter
soldiers was for the typical Constantinopolitan urbanite, the former regulation must have been a
welcome comfort for those whose property had been commissioned by the emperor for the
common defense and welfare of the city. The fact that the latter measure revoked the former
exemption, which was to “be observed in perpetuity,” speaks volumes to the state of the
Thracian countryside in early 422.17
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Nevertheless, the lack of primary source literature on the subject prevents a more
protracted investigation of the Huns’ activity south of the Lower and Middle Danube in the early
420s. The same problem plagues the remainder of the decade and the early 430s, with scattered
fragments offering details to seemingly two additional different Hunnic invasions of the
Danubian provinces of unknown dates between 422 and 434. Theodoret of Cyrus offers through
his Ecclesiastical History the depiction of one such invasion in parallel with an unspecified war
with Sassanid Persia:
So when Rhoïlas [Ruga], Prince of the Scythian Nomads [Huns], had crossed the Danube
with a vast host and was ravaging and plundering Thrace, and was threatening to besiege
the imperial city [Constantinopolis], and summarily seize it and deliver it to destruction,
God smote him from on high with thunderbolt and storm, burning up the invader and
destroying all his host. A similar providence was shown, too, in the Persian war. The
Persians received information that the Romans were occupied elsewhere, and so in
violation of the treaty of Peace, marched against their neighbours, who found none to aid
them under the attack, because, in reliance on the Peace, the emperor had dispatched his
generals and his men to other wars [?]. Then the further march of the Persians was stayed
by a very violent storm of rain and hail; their horses refused to advance; in twenty days
they had not succeeded in advancing as many furlongs. Meanwhile the generals returned
and mustered their troops.18
In this account, Ruga dies amidst his leading Hunnic forces against the Eastern Romans after
having thoroughly looted Thrace and threatened to set the Eastern Roman capital to siege—the
lack of information regarding the status of the garrisons and the dubious prospect of attempting
to besiege the Theodosian Walls with a cavalry-centric force notwithstanding, to Theodoret such
a situation must have appeared dire enough to attribute the Empire’s deliverance to divine
intervention.
Embellishments aside, Theodoret’s description offers numerous details for RomanHunnic engagements not found in any other source; at the same time, he stands in direct conflict
with the historical account of Priscus over the nature of Ruga’s death:
18
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When Rua [Ruga] was king of the Huns, the Amilzuri, Itimari, Tounsoures, Boisci and
other tribes who were living near to the Danube were fleeing to fight on the side of the
Romans.? Rua decided to go to war with these tribes and sent Eslas, a man who usually
handled negotiations over differences between himself and the Romans, threatening to
break the present peace if they did not hand over all who had fled to them. The Romans
wished to send an embassy to the Huns, and both Plinthas and Dionysius wished to go.
Plinthas was a Scythian, Dionysius a Thracian; both were generals and had held the
Roman consulship. Since it seemed that Eslas would reach Rua before the embassy was
dispatched, Plinthas sent along with him Sengilach, one of his own retainers, to persuade
Rua to negotiate with none of the Romans but himself. When Rua died, the kingship of
the Huns devolved upon Attila and Bleda, and the Roman senate recommended that
Plinthas be sent as ambassador to them.19
The eventual product of these negotiations was the Treaty of Margus—so named for the fortified
city at which the Hunnic and East Roman dignitaries met and drafted it, which stipulated that the
Roman Empire refuse to permit tribes hostile to the Huns to immigrate, that the Romans return
those which had already done so, that “there should be safe markets with equal rights for
Romans and Huns, and that the Romans annually pay seven hundred pounds of gold to the
Scythian [Hunnic] kings [Attila and Bleda], as previously the payments had been three hundred
and fifty pounds.”20
The distinct narratives of Marcellinus, Theodoret, and Priscus present the only direct
evidence for the Hunnic invasions of the Roman East in the 420s and early 430s; the invasion
recounted by Marcellinus in 422 is the only such encounter with a discernable date and a
reasonable degree of corroborating material, whereas the invasions described by Theodoret and
Priscus, occurring sometime between the invasion of 422 and Ruga’s death in 434, dated by the
Gallic Chronicle of 452, cannot be accurately dated.21 Modern historians have offered a diverse
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series of dates for the Hunnic invasions, but the common consensus is that the three accounts
describe three separate invasions, each breaching the Danube Limes and withdrawing from
whence they came. Arnold Jones, Brian Croke, and Christopher Kelly have postulated that the
350-pound subsidy described by Priscus was likely a stipulation of the peace negotiated with the
Huns in 422, and while this fits the evidence, it cannot be confirmed either.22
Regardless of the specific dates, the fact that the Danube Limes had been broken through
on three separate occasions and much of the richest parts of the Roman Balkans had been
pillaged at least twice would have been for the Eastern Roman Empire and its riverine frontier a
protracted disaster. If earlier and later precedent in Hunnic invasions carry—though the lack of
hard evidence bars absolute certainty—local fortifications on the river and in the Danubian
hinterlands to the south in the vicinity of the Hun’s point of crossing on the Middle Danube
likely suffered considerable damages. The devastation of the Thracian farmlands, as during the
Gothic War, would have put an immediate logistical strain on both the rural populace and the
security of the Danube frontier. While any singular invasion would have certainly hampered
Roman operations throughout the Balkan Peninsula and along the frontier, the suppressive factor
on both civilian and military logistics and morale would have meant a distinctly lethargic
recovery for the Eastern Roman Empire, and paints a distinctly unfavorable picture for its
limitanei and comitatenses when Attila invaded for the first time in the early 440s.23
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The Eastern Romans, however, were not alone in their dealings with the trans-Danubian
Huns over the 420s and 430s. In the interregnum following the death of Honorius in 423, the
Western Roman court, headed by magister militum Castinus, elevated a certain prinmicerius
notariorum named Ioannes, or ‘John,’ in Rome to the position of augustus in the West.24 This
appointment was met with immediate hostility from the Eastern court, who viewed the rise of
John as illegitimate; Theodosius replied later in the year by elevating the six- or seven-year-old
Valentinian III, his cousin and the nephew of the late Honorius, to the purple. A succession war
thus ensued as political hostilities spilled over into the affairs of the Empire’s eastern and
western armies.
Late in 424, John sent Flavius Aetius, a promising young Western Roman politician and
curi palatii (lit. “Steward of the Palace”), east with a “huge sum of gold” to bolster his field
forces with Hunnic mercenaries against an expected Eastern Roman campaign.25 Aetius was
undeniably the most prudent choice for such negotiations; as a teenager, he had been sent as a
political hostage to the court of Alaric for three years and thereafter to the realm of the Huns,
most likely to the court of Uldin or Charaton.26 During these years, he learned much of the
Huns, possibly including their language, and would utilize his experience to great effect
throughout his life as one of the Western Roman Empire’s last great defenders.27
While Aetius was still seeking the Huns, Theodosius arranged for a campaign to be
undertaken against the Western court, having relocated to Ravenna to wait for Aetius’ forces,
commanded by Ardabur and his son Aspar.28 Early in 425, after having marched through the
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Balkans and into northern Italia, the Eastern Roman army successfully took the city and captured
the Western pretender, after which, as Procopius later wrote:
[Valentinian and his keepers] brought him out in the hippodrome of Aquileia with one of
his hands cut off and caused him to ride in state on an ass, and then after he had suffered
much ill treatment from the stage-performers there, both in word and in deed, he put him
to death. Thus Valentinian took of the power of the West.29
Around the same time, Castinus was banished.30 Merely three days after the execution of John,
Aetius returned at the head of an army of Huns, 60,000-strong.31 Following a series of
indecisive engagements with the Eastern Roman forces in which “many fell on both sides,”
during which he must have learned of the invalidation of his cause, Aetius came to an
arrangement with the Galla Placidia and the Eastern Roman commanders, and permitted peace
between the two halves of the Empire to be restored.32 In so doing, he granted his Hunnic army
a generous payout for breaking off the campaign abruptly, and sent them on their way after an
exchange of hostages and oaths.33
After the Huns departed, the Western Romans imparted to Aetius the titles of comes and
magister militum of Gaul, and sent him to manage the military administration of his new
command.34 Over the following years, his command saw a range of successes in maintaining a
measure of order in Gaul; the prestige from his campaigns in Gaul, along with his ability to
“summon the power of Hunnic forces at his will,” enabled him to compel an otherwise unwilling
Galla Placidia—she never trusted him due to his faithfully having served John in attempting to
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keep the throne from her son Valentinian—to appoint him as magister utriusque militum (lit.
‘commander of both forces,’ infantry and cavalry) of the Western Roman Empire in 429.35
During his time on campaign in Gaul away from the offices of Ravenna, the Western Romans
elected to launch a campaign against the Huns in Pannonia; Marcellinus Comes recorded that in
the year 427, “the Pannonian provinces, which had been retained for fifty years by the Huns,
were retaken by the Romans.”36
Neither details of this campaign nor the reasons for it have survived. Perhaps with Aetius
preoccupied on the opposite face of the Western Roman Empire, Galla Placidia in recognition of
his rising star and familiarity with the Huns sought to weaken them and drive the bound of their
territory further from Italia. Pannonia had, after all, been a West Roman holding since the turn
of the fifth century.37 Maenchen-Helfen has postulated that the lack of Alans’ having been
mentioned in tandem with Huns in primary sources from the early 410s onwards may have
pointed to a break between the two groups.38 The Alans had served as the vanguard of the
Hunnic Horde and a critical part of the Huns’ collective fighting force as they moved into
Europe, and if they largely left the Huns for open lands in which they could settle in Eastern
Europe, the forces Ruga and his fellow Huns could summon to defend their territories could
certainly have been weakened.39
This campaign speaks to the state of Roman Pannonia by the early 430s. Many of the
major cities in and along the perimeter of the half of the Pannonian Plain which Roman territory
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constituted had been plundered between the early 400s and the 420s. Ravaged—and likely
partially settled—by countless barbarian immigrations after an untold number of uncontrolled
river crossings over the previous decades and standing at the periphery of both Eastern and
Western Roman power, Roman Pannonia had been gradually occupied by the Hun forces
originating from the lands directly across the Middle Danube. The extent to which the Western
Romans were able to restore imperial control over the region is also highly suspect; whether the
region, replete with partially depopulated cities and derelict fortifications, was largely
reconquered or partially occupied by modest Roman force cannot be ascertained with certainty.40
What is clear, however, is that Roman action drove local Hunnic forces from at least some
measure of the Pannonian provinces, and, by the inference of Marcellinus’ account, managed to
hold the territories beyond the close of the year. Despite the fifty years Marcellinus perceived
the Pannonian provinces as lost, their lauded reclamation would not last the decade.
While still sparce, compared to the extant materials discussing the 410s and 420s,
primary source literature detailing Roman-Hunnic affairs in 430s “flow comparatively
copiously,” Maenchen-Helfen writes, but “it is not easy to reconstruct even the main events.”41
In 432, Aetius held the Western Roman consulate, but his power in this influential role was not
remain stable for long. Bonifacius, another Western Roman general that had been jostling with
Aetius, and until 429, magister utriusque militiae Flavius Felix, for influence in Valentinian’s
court, and who had been in rebellion against Galla Placidia’s regime since 427, returned to Italy
in 432 at the Augusta-regent’s summons to make amends with her and Valentinian.42 Almost
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overnight, Aetius, still the object of Placidia’s ire, suddenly found himself politically marooned.
Not long thereafter, Placidia revoked Aetius’ command in absentia, appointing Bonifacius the
title of comes and the office of magister utriusque militiae.43 Aetius responded by rising in
revolt and clashed with Bonifacius’ troops at the Battle of Rimini:
On the instigation of Placidia, the mother of the emperor Valentinian, a great battle was
waged between the patricians Boniface [Bonifacius] and Aetius. Aetius engaged
Boniface and wounded him, with a longer sword [or ‘Lance’] than that of Boniface,
which had been made for him the previous day. He himself was unscathed. Three
months later Boniface died from the injury he had incurred, imploring his very wealthy
wife Pelagia to marry no one other than Aetius.44
Despite his initiative and having mortally wounded his rival, Aetius nevertheless lost the
engagement and withdrew to his private country estate. Bonifacius’ position was swiftly taken
up by his vengeful son-in-law, Sebastianus, who orchestrated a botched assassination attempt on
his late father’s adversary.
It was at this point, with nowhere else to turn and evidently beset by hostile forces in
Italia, that Aetius fled to the Huns, quietly slipping across the Adriatic to Dalmatia and travelling
by night overland to Pannonia and thence to the Middle Danube.45 Between late 432 and early
433, he arrived at the court of Ruga deep in the Pannonian Plain, and, while the details as to his
methods of petitioning the Hunnic king for aid have not survived, reportedly set out for Italia at
the head of a substantial troop of Huns.46 Whether or not he truly was on the march with Hunnic
units, or if he was, whatever their number happened to be, is indeterminate.47 Nevertheless, in
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the face of this oncoming juggernaut, Sebastianus either fled or was banished from Italia, after
which he retired Constantinopolis where he would remain in relative obscurity for the next
decade.48 Galla Placidia, caught without recourse, ultimately accepted his supremacy in Western
affairs. By the end of 433, thanks to the timely imposition of Ruga’s Huns, Aetius had fully
reclaimed his former post in the Western Roman court. Not long thereafter, Valentinian reached
majority, consigning his mother to a position away from the locus of Western Roman power, and
leaving the ascendent Aetius in a position of almost absolute authority in the affairs of the
Western Roman military and political machines.49
Aetius’ repeated reliance on the Huns had important ramifications for the Middle
Danube. In exchange for Hunnic assistance, according to an excerpt from Priscus, it seems that
at some point he deliberately ceded at least a part of Pannonia to the Huns:
Edeco, a Scythian who had performed outstanding deeds in war, came again as
ambassador together with Orestes, a Roman by origin who lived in the part of Pannonia
close to the river Save which became subject to the barbarian by the treaty made with
Aetius, the general of the western Romans.50
If such an interpretation is correct, while the holdings of distant Pannonia Valeria were
admittedly in some ways indefensible, the layout of the Danube frontier would have been grossly
violated, and for the first time, formally and deliberately by treaty with an external power of
nebulous—potentially hostile—intent.51 Roman roads, blazing through the otherwise rugged

48

Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 262.
Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire, 1:248-249.
50
Priscus, Fragment 11.1.1-5.
51
Kelly, The End of Empire, 112-113.; Kelly postulates that Aetius could not control both the unstable
Gallic provinces and the whole of the more remote, less wealthy Danubian provinces at the same time.;
Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns, 87-90.; Priscus, Fragment 11.; The concept of a Roman cession
to Ruga in exchange for his assisting Aetius in 432, while upheld by numerous historians throughout the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, has been called into question by Otto Maenchen-Helfen. He attributes
this concept as a “misinterpretation” of Priscus’ eleventh fragment, citing that its proper translation alludes
to Aetius ceding “Pannonian territory,” rather than the whole of Roman Pannonia or any specific
Pannonian province, to Attila rather than Ruga. In any case, later in the same fragment, Maenchen-Helfen
notes that the specification, “Constantiolus was a man ‘from the land of the Paionians [referring to
49

109

Alpine and Balkan terrain, stretched out to the hinterlands of both halves of the Empire, lending
the Huns and their subjects prefabricated express routes for the invasion of either. Additionally,
the uniformity of the Danube frontier, while arguably dubious prior to, as well as after, the
Roman offensive into Pannonia in 427, had degenerated in such a manner as to suddenly bestow
the Lower and Upper stretches of the frontier with an additional flank for which their design had
not incorporated a defensive contingency. By 435, the eastern extreme of the Styrian Alps and
the southern extreme of the Carpathians represented the vague limits of the frontier on the Upper
and Lower Danube respectively.
Within about a year’s time of Aetius’ reclamation of the role of magister utriusque
militiae, according to the corroboration of the Gallic Chronicle of 452, Priscus, and Socrates,
Ruga would die on campaign a short distance into Eastern Roman territory.52 Some years prior,
his brother Octar, allegedly king over the Huns and their subjects west of the Pannonian Plain,
had perished on campaign against the Burgundians, and it is not clear if their brother Mundzuk
ruled over any land himself—the Hunnic throne over tribes of Ruga and Octar was thus left
open.53 In 434 or 435, Attila and Bleda, sons of Mundzuk, acceded to the Hunnic throne and set
about securing their authority within the Hunnic realm.54 Not long thereafter, they met with
Roman dignitaries at the frontier city of Margus to sign a Treaty of the same name, appeasing the
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Huns with 700 pounds of gold per annum, a generous trade agreement, and immigration and
extradition rights along the Danube frontier in which the Hunnic word would carry substantial
weight thereafter.
For the Eastern Romans, despite the Middle Danube having been strategically
compromised, this conciliatory measure kept the peace between the Roman and Hunnic Empires
for the remainder of the decade. The Huns were for the time being contented to trade with the
Empire whilst securing their own internal and frontier affairs; in the same passage in which
Priscus laid out the stipulations of the Treaty of Margus, he recorded, “when they had made
peace with the Romans, Attila, Bleda, and their forces marched through Scythia subduing the
tribes there and also made war with the Sorosgi.”55 At the same time, they conducted numerous
joint operations with Aetius and his Western Roman forces, including the conquest and
destruction of Gundahar’s Burgundian Kingdom on the Rhine and the failed siege of the
Visigothic capital at Narbonne.56
It was not until the early 440s that renewed tension between the realms of Attila and
Theodosius, coupled with troubles elsewhere throughout the Roman Empire, once more
threatened to undermine the existing status quo. On October 19, 439, the Vandals, under the
leadership of Gaiseric, successfully took Roman Carthage, and with it the North African
farmlands from which much of the Empire’s grain supply was derived.57 The Vandals had
initially been invited to North Africa by Bonifacius, who sought to use them to dispel Western
Roman general Sigisvult, having commanded one of armies Galla Placidia had sent to reign the
in errant North African during his time of rebellion. Since the 420s, they had gradually migrated
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eastwards along the coast, defeating Bonifacius multiple times along with various additional
forces sent to him under Western Roman general Flavius Aspar; in recognition of their inability
to defeat the Vandals in light of their other European campaigns, the Western Romans signed a
treaty with the Vandals in 435, granting them a considerable portion of Mauretania and Numidia.
Gaiseric elected to dispense with this treaty four years later, moving with his people to
Carthage; as much of the populace was engaged in the city’s Hippodrome at the time of his
arrival, the Vandalic takeover was virtually bloodless. Nevertheless, Vandalic occupation of
Africa Proconsularis—to be followed by a methodic occupation of the Baleares, Sardinia, and
Corsica—proved a severe threat to the Empire’s logistics and the security of its coastal cities. In
recognition of the new naval threat, the most severe non-Roman naval force loose in the
Mediterranean since the Punic Wars, Theodosius expanded the limited sea walls of
Constantinopolis to connect with the Theodosian Walls and issued a decree restoring the public
right to bear arms.58
Yet, while Vandals acted with impunity in North Africa and throughout Mare Nostrum,
as much as Galla Placidia besought the aid of her nephew in Constantinopolis, the Eastern
Romans could not address them in the immediate. When he died in 440, Bahram V had left
Sassanid Persia at the zenith of its power; Yazdegerd II, shortly after acceding to the throne,
declared war on the Eastern Romans, citing frontier encroachment by the Romans along their
shared border as his casus belli.59 Neither side’s forces were able to swiftly gain a decisive
advantage as the Romans, who saw the Vandals as a more pressing threat, fought defensively,
hoping for an opportunity to sue for peace.60 By June of 441, the brief conflict was over; both
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parties vowed to refrain from establishing new fortifications in Mesopotamia for the foreseeable
future and the Romans agreed to pay an annual subsidy.61 After this brief conflict, Sassanid
Persia would turn its attention eastwards towards India and Transoxiana—there would not be
another war between Eastern Rome and the ailing Empire’s ancient rival for the next sixty-two
years.62
It was during this war with Persia that tensions along the Danube began to actively flare
once more. During the annual fair at one of the Danubian outposts beyond the river, a number of
Huns attacked the Roman merchants and tradesmen present without provocation, killing many
present.63 When the Eastern Roman government raised this issue with the Huns, the latter
retorted that their actions had been made as a riposte; Priscus writes:
For they claimed that the bishop of Margus had crossed over to their land and, searching
out their royal tombs, had stolen the valuables stored there. Furthermore, they said that if
they did not hand him over and also hand over the fugitives as had been agreed (and there
were very many amongst the Romans), they would prosecute the war.64
The Romans never acceded to the Huns’ demands. One year later, after Theodosius’ field forces
had embarked and departed Constantinopolis for Vandal-occupied Sicily—many among them
likely having been pulled from posts along and behind the Danube to oppose Yazdegerd’s abrupt
offensive—and Bleda and Attila followed through with their threat.65
As the sound of thunder heard remote, the Huns fell upon the Danube Limes lining the
southeast extreme of the Pannonian Plain, their forces concentrated against Viminacium and
Margus, the region’s foremost fortified cities, whilst detachments dispersed to “ravage very
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many cities along the river.”66 Before long, the gates of Viminacium had been broken in and the
Huns plundered the ancient city. Margus, however, fell by less honorable means:
Some were arguing that the bishop of Margus should be handed over, so that the whole
Roman people should not be endangered by the war for the sake of one man. He,
suspecting that he would be surrendered, slipped away from those in the city, crossed
over to the enemy and promised that he would betray the city to them if the Scythian
kings made him any reasonable offer. They said that if he fulfilled his promise, they
would treat him well in every way, and hands were shaken and oaths given for what had
been promised. He re-crossed to Roman territory with a large force of barbarians, which
he concealed right by the river bank, and, rousing it during the night, he handed the city
over to the enemy.67
After Margus was sacked, Priscus recorded, “the position of the Huns was greatly improved,”
with the two frontier hardpoints of Viminacium and Margus quashed, the roadway south to
Naissus lay open.68 Naissus held for some time, being a “populous and well-fortified city” even
among the defensible cities of the Roman Balkans, but was ultimately taken by a sophisticated
battery of Hunnic siege engines.69 Great old Roman cities, having enjoyed resounding growth
and prosperity for centuries, fell to the Hunnic onslaught as titanic dominoes—Naissus,
Singidunum, Sirmium, and countless townships and villages bedighting the crests of the
landscape, lay in ruin.
Despite the fearsome destruction along the Middle and Lower Danube and throughout the
Balkan hinterlands, Attila’s first major invasion of the Eastern Roman Empire does not have a
readily identifiable endpoint, but events over the following years suggest that it drew to a close
in late 442 or early 443. On September 12, 443, Theodosius passed a law dictating the
reclamation of the frontier and the restoration of the Danube Limes that had been so devastated;
new and existing troops were to be trained and drilled, the Classis Flavia Moesica—and what
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remained of the Classis Flavia Pannonica—were to be restored to operability, additional rations
were allotted to the Danubian limitanei, and severe punishments for officers daring to dip into
their soldiers’ keep were reiterated.70 Land in the immediate vicinity of frontier fortifications
were also rededicated to the private use of the limitanei.71
Ultimately, with little other option available to him, Theodosius elected to buy the Huns
off, likely dolling out a considerably heftier tribute to his quasi-suzerain residing on the
Pannonian Plain.72 The Eastern Romans has signed a begrudging peace with the Vandals earlier
in 442 and had begun to bring their forces home, but they would not reach Constantinopolis in
time to give their emperor deployable the game pieces he needed to stave off a costly Hunnic
ultimatum.73 Within a year or two following their return, probably in 443 or 444, all the while
Theodosius and his staff had been rebuilding the defenses and preparing for a future engagement,
the Eastern Romans reneged on their treaty.74
Encouraging their sudden rebellion were reports of a schism forming in the realm of the
Huns. Sometime between the conclusion of the Roman-Hunnic War of 441-442 and the
resumption of hostilities in 447, Bleda appears to have died at his own brother’s hand, leaving
Attila the Hunnic Empire’s sole leader.75 Whether Bleda was murdered, along with the potential
means, specific motive, and particular opportunity accompanying such information has
regrettably been lost, but that the event delayed Attila’s response to the Eastern Romans, as he
reassessed his power base, cannot be denied. Nevertheless, by 447, he had prepared a response
in the form of a cataclysmic invasion.
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Over the mid-440s, Attila dispatched diplomatic envoys to enquire as why the Eastern
Romans had not been paying their tribute nor extraditing fugitives to him as agreed.76 Priscus
wrote:
Moreover, concerning the future tribute, ambassadors should come to him for
discussions, for, if they prevaricated or prepared for war, he would not willingly restrain
his Scythian [Hunnic] forces. When those at court read these demands, they said that
they would by no means hand over the fugitives amongst them and that, along with these,
they would submit to war; but they would send ambassadors to settle the disputes. When
the views of the Romans were reported to him, Attila reacted in anger and ravaged
Roman territory, destroying some forts and attacking Ratiaria, a very large and populous
city.77
Ratiaria was an integral part of the limes on the Lower Danube; along with the smaller riverfront
cities of Bononia, Drobeta, and Dierna—all within 150 miles upstream—these fortified cities
guarded the Lower Danube’s western approaches through the southern Carpathians, and they
would not be the only losses for the Eastern Romans. “Philippopolis, Arcadiopolis, Constantia,
and very many other cities” from the Danube to Greece would in the process of Attila’s invasion
suffer similar fates.78 After 447, while scattered peasant dwellings and villages would slowly
creep out of the ashes, most of the major urban centers on the Danube and throughout the Upper
Balkans would quite simply never recover.79
The attacks on the Danube fortifications, minor castella and the cities that had grown
from the frontier castra alike, were distinctly methodical. While in the face of Attila’s
overwhelming forces, the Roman’s static defensive hardpoints, either on the frontier or the
interior, could not hold indefinitely, they certainly provided unwelcome obstacles to his forces,
costing them in kind considerable manpower and, perhaps even more so, considerable time to
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effectively besiege.80 Furthermore, just as they had against smaller disorganized raids from the
Pontic Steppe decades and centuries prior, they could still pose a serious threat to Hunnic supply
in the event of future Roman-Hunnic exchanges.
But destroying the cities and infrastructure of the Danube Limes was not enough for the
rampaging Hunnic king and his forces. After Attila had annihilated two Roman field armies and
captured every fortification in the Thracian hinterlands expect for Hadrianopolis and Heracleia,
Theodosius was forced to sue for peace. The costs were unsurprisingly harsh; the Romans were
forced to pay arrears of 6,000 pounds of gold to accommodate the original terms set in 442 along
with an additional 2,100 pounds per annum.81
While crippling for the potential of rebuilding devastated Thrace and raising a new field
army, the greatest penalty of the peace of 447 lay in the demilitarized zone Atilla established
south of the Danube. This region, a full “five days’ march” in breadth from the river southwards,
extending from Pannonia to the smoldering wreck of Novae on the center of the Lower Danube,
was to be evacuated of Roman populations, fortifications, or frontier outposts.82 In forcing the
creation of such a geopolitical no-man’s-land, the Eastern Roman Empire had been deprived of
its most critical fixed defensive assert, and while the Haemus Mountains and Dinaric Alps could
offer some limited geographical means of defense as in the case of the Roman-Gothic War of
376-382, following Attila’s peace deal of 477, Nova Roma existed solely at his mercy. Thus,
with the Eastern Roman treasury running on fumes, the once-grand cities and fortresses of the
Danube having been reduced to smoke and rubble, and the bound of Constantinopolis’ expansive
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influence and administration forcibly curtailed well south of the old frontier for the foreseeable
future, the Hunnic offensive of 447 marked the end of the old Roman Danube frontier.
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Conclusion
For all we have and are,
For all our children's fate,
Stand up and take the war.
The Hun is at the gate!
Our world has passed away,
In wantonness o'erthrown.
There is nothing left to-day
But steel and fire and stone...—Rudyard Kipling

I

t is as of yet unclear what the status of the Danube was when the first Roman expeditionary
forces arrived at its shorelines, but few likely anticipated that it would, short centuries later,

have become the greatest and most calamitous frontier of the burgeoning Empire’s history. In
his posthumously published Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, as echoed by his
various other studies, Belgian historian Henri Pirenne wrote of the extraordinary lost potential of
the Danube for the affairs of Medieval Europe:
It might be, and indeed it has sometimes been, thought, that the valley of the Danube took
the place of the Mediterranean as the great route of communication between the East and
the West. This might indeed have happened, had it not been rendered inaccessible from
the very first by the Avars, and, soon afterwards, by the Magyars. The sources show us
no more than the traffic of a few boats loaded with salt from the salt-mines of Strasburg.1
While it would not reach the same level of urban development until the early modern era, nor
ever again boast the same weight of defensive infrastructure it had attained before the Huns’
arrival in Europe, the destruction wrought by Attila in 447 did not yet spell the frontier’s end.
In 451, the decisive Hunnic conqueror invaded Gaul, wherein he was famously defeated
on June 20, at the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains. Herein, Aetius had mustered a meager force
of Roman veterans and conscripts, bolstered by additional contingents of barbarians from around
Gaul—the decedents of those that had fatefully crossed the Rhine at the end of 406—and the
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levies of Visigothic King Theodoric I for a valiant last stand against the Huns. Undaunted, Attila
regathered himself and his forces on the Pannonian Plains, and in 452 launched a second
campaign into Italia, crossing the undefended Julian Alps early in the year, and razing the
northern Italian countryside and its foremost cities from Aquileia to Milan, to the ground.
Turning southwards later in the year, intending to do the same to the Urbs Aeterna itself, he was
met some distance from the city by a desperate delegation headed by Pope Leo, whose legendary
conversation with Attila, possibly compounded by tribute and disease among his ranks, having
miraculously convinced him to turn away from his destructive aim and withdraw with his loot
from Italia, belongs to the ages.
Later in 453, whilst celebrating his marriage to his latest wife, a beautiful young Goth
named Ildico, the Scourge of God suffered a hemorrhage and died a poetically anticlimactic
death, thereby alleviating the citizenry of the beleaguered Roman Empire of its gravest and most
feared external threat. Nevertheless, the damage wrought by the Huns and other barbarous
peoples upon the structure of the Empire had been done. The Western Roman Empire would
continue to crumble as immigrants from Germania and beyond steadily settled in the formerly
imperial territories, erecting it its place their own various kingdoms, setting the stage for the rise
of European Medievalry. David Nicolle writes:
Despite massive desertions by the often-unpaid frontier limitanei, archaeology shows that
soldiers were now bringing their families within the forts. ... to the very end, plaintive
messages came from units of limitanei on the Danube frontier begging for back pay until
in 476, the last Western Emperor was finally deposed by his own Germanic foederati.2
With the fall of the West, the frontier on the Upper Danube, the oldest and perhaps the most
stable segment of the river frontier, quickly dissolved in the face of barbarian immigration and
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the rise of various new states in much the same way as its Middle Danubian counterpart had in
the 430s.
In the East, the Lower Danube alone would soldier on as a region of import for the
Romans. After the death of Attila, his sons would attempt to hold the de-Romanized border strip
for some years, but as inter-tribal Hunnic organization broke down and the Huns slowly
effervesced into the fabric of other Eastern European tribes, the trickle of information regarding
activity around the Danube quickly dried up and from between the late 460s to the 490s, the
lands beyond the Haemus lay virtually silent in written record. Roman interests in the region
resurfaced in the late 490s, as, with nothing barring the crossing of the former frontier, numerous
Slavic, Bulgar, and Avar tribes began to move south through Moesia.3 As had so often happened
over the recent centuries, conflicts on the other side of the Empire, namely the Isaurian War
(492-497) and the Anastasian War (502-506), caused Constantinopolis to pull troops from their
posts in Thrace and Greece eastwards beyond Anatolia, leaving the Roman Balkans gravely
exposed. As trans-Danubian barbarians plundered the vulnerable hinterlands, Emperor
Anastasius constructed the Anastasian Wall—a massive earthen bulwark spanning over 30 miles
from the southern Euxine coast to the Sea of Marmara—to protect Constantinopolis and its
immediate surroundings.4
While Eastern Roman influence gradually began to creep back to the Lower Danube
under Anastasius and Justin I, it was under the guidance of Justinian the Great that the
foundations of its resurgence, albeit brief, were to be laid.5 While the line of fortifications was a
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mere shadow of its former self, not possessing as much structure as that of the frontier under
Valens and Theodosius I, numerous derelict forts and largely ruined cities were reconstituted and
returned to service.6 The remains of Singidunum, razed to the ground by the Huns, wavered
between Hunnic tribes, Gepids, and Ostrogoths, until the early 510s when it fell back into
imperial hands; by the 530s, Justinian had rebuilt much of it to its former glory, after which its
resumed its role as a frontier bastion. Viminacium, one of the first Eastern Roman cities razed
by the Huns, was restored in like manner. Sirmium, one of the Roman Empire’s most important
urban centers and the former capital of the Praetorian Prefecture of Illyricum, was reconquered
from the Gepids in the late 560s and restored under Justin II, which demonstrated that Justinian’s
efforts at securing his northern flank did not cease with his death. Continual Eastern Roman
counteroffensives had slowly restored a considerable fraction of the Balkan Peninsula to the
holdings of Constantinopolis, successfully preventing the establishment of Slavic settlements
within imperial territory until the late sixth century.7 Nevertheless, gradually increasing pressure
from the various peoples beyond the river, particularly the Slavs and Avars, coupled with the
omnipresent tension of the eastern front, did not portend well for the fragile integrity of the new
Danube frontier.
Arising to the throne in 582, Emperor Maurice made a concerted effort to hold the
Danube against the barbarians, waging war continuously for his entire reign. He had inherited a
brutally destructive war with Persia begun in 572 when his predecessor, Tiberius II, refused to
pay Persia a previously arranged tribute. The resulting disparity between forces in the Eastern
provinces and the Balkans had predictably detrimental results; in 582, the underdefended
Sirmium was leveled by the Avars who began to systematically destroy scattered Roman
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fortifications in the Upper and Eastern Balkans, threatening Constantinopolis itself in 584, and
plundering Roman territory deep into Greece.
In 591, Roman involvement in a two-year Persian civil war resulted in a favorable peace
for the Empire, entailing the reacquisition of numerous critical fortresses along the Persian
border as well as a new partition of the Caucasus region. Moving his forces westwards, Maurice
began to gain the upper hand over his Avarian nemeses, steadily recovering the Danube defenses
and launching numerous punitive campaigns into the heartlands of the Avars; by the end of the
decade, Maurice was in firm control of the Danube frontier and Balkan hinterlands. Over the
course of his Balkan campaigns, the embattled emperor seems to have come to a unique
understanding of the strategic difficulties of the Balkan defenses even in times of peace with
Persia, devoting several pages of his Strategikon to warring against Slavs, Antes, and other
similar peoples from the Lower Danube; he wrote:
They live among nearly impenetrable forests, rivers, lake, and marshes, and have made
the exits from their settlements branch out in many directions because of the dangers they
might face. ... Do not station these troops close to the Danube, for the enemy would find
out how few they are and consider them unimportant. Nor should they be stationed very
far away, so their will be no delay, if it becomes necessary, to have them join the
invading army. They should stay about a day’s march from the Danube.8
The barbarians’ awareness of the Romans’ numbers on any of the Roman frontiers, proved to be
a universally destabilizing factor for Roman frontier management; “the faith of the barbarians
and the ancient terror of the Roman name,” as Gibbon put it, was not enough to hold the Rhine
when Stilicho stripped it of its garrisons to counter the Goths invading Italia in the early 400s.9
The realization of this fact would not save the new Danube frontier.
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In 602, Maurice was deposed, and with him went the integrity of the Danube frontier.
With the veteran emperor Maurice having been dispatched from his appointment, Khosrow II of
Persia declared war on the politically disjointed Eastern Roman Empire. In the process, troop
redeployments weakened the Danube frontier for the last time, and within years of the war’s
instigation, thousands of Avars, Huns, Bulgars, Antes, and others would pour across the northern
frontier, capturing several of the frontier’s key defensive cities for themselves and settling
throughout the formerly Roman hinterlands of the Balkan Peninsula. While in the centuries
thereafter, Roman influence and armies would occasionally grace the territories of the Empire’s
former frontier, the Romans would never see a definite boundary established where once their
most critical lay.
The problem of the Danube was unsolvable. The Danube river frontier, in ideal
circumstances, offered the legions the tactical benefits of the defense in a forced crossing
scenario, but it offered the Roman Empire holistically a strategic catch-22; there was no more
homogenous landform better suited for providing a fixed physical and psychological border,
transport, and intelligence gathering opportunities than the Danube, yet the river was so long and
the territory which lined its banks was so diverse and rugged—so naturally unsuited to the
Roman way of war—that it stood as an ultimately untenable defensive system in the threat of
pervasive, ineradicable, hostile forces on the opposing shore. From the perspective of the
average legionnaire stationed on the Danube, the barbarian threat sprang from an endless of
geographic abyss of unassailable depth. Whenever any other frontier, most notably that which
was shared with Persia, became spontaneously active, thereby pulling limitanei and reserve

124

comitatenses from their posts along the river, the Empire’s core provinces behind it invariably
suffered, obfuscating the security and stability Augustus dreamed for the Empire.10
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